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INTRODUCTION
American Indian and Alaska Native women are under attack. The vio-
lence perpetuated against them has reached epidemic proportions. The sta-
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tistics are shocking. American Indian and Alaska Natives suffer from vio-
lence at a rate two and a half times greater than that of any other population
in the United States.' According to the United States Department of Justice,
one in three American Indian and Alaska Native women (Indian women)
will be raped, 2 and six in ten will experience physical abuse in their life-
times.3 Stalkers also target Indian women at a rate more than double that of
any other population.4
Unlike other women in the United States, Indian women are more
likely to experience interracial rather than intra-racial violence.' In fact, the
per capita rate of interracial violence against Indian women greatly exceeds
that of the general population.6 According to the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ), non-Indian offenders commit 88% of all violence against Indian
women.7 Nearly four of five Indian victims of sexual assault identified the
offender as white,' and three of four Indian victims of intimate-partner vio-
lence described the offender as of a different race.9
Even more problematic than these mind-boggling statistics is the legal
reality in Indian country.'° Federal law prohibits the governments of Indian
1. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-167R, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS 1 (2010)
[hereinafter GAO DECLINATION REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1167r.pdf ("Specifically, from 1992 to 2001 American
Indians experienced violent crimes at a rate of 101 violent crimes per 1,000 persons annually,
compared to the national rate of 41 violent crimes per 1,000 persons."); Violence Against
Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. §
901 (2006); STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 7
(2004), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf.
2. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF
THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS
FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 22 ex.7 (2000), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781 .pdf.
3. Id.
4. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND STALKING: THE SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 11 (1997),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ovw/166377.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
STALKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 8 ex.4 (1998), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles I/ovw/172204.pdf.
5. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 7 (1999), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic.pdf.
6. See id. at 8.
7. PERRY, supra note 1, at 8.
8. GREENFIELD & SMITH, supra note 5, at 7.
9. Id. at 8 (noting that among American Indian victims, "75% of the intimate vic-
timizations and 25% of the family victimizations involved an offender of a different race," a
much higher percentage than among victims of all races as a whole).
10. Indian country is a legal term defined and used by the federal government to
refer "to the territory set aside for the operation of special rules allocating governmental
power[, including criminal jurisdiction,] among Indian tribes, the federal government, and
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nations from prosecuting most non-Indian offenders-and only allows tribal
governments to punish Indians for minor offenses." In most communities in
the United States, the local county or city government has the authority to
investigate and prosecute both misdemeanor and felony crimes. 2 In Indian
country, the local government is often the tribal government. However, fed-
eral legislation and case law have left tribal governments with far less legal
authority to protect their citizens than any other local government. Re-
strictions placed on tribal governmental authority are a key factor creating
and perpetuating the disproportionate violence against Indian women. They
prevent Indian women from relying upon their tribal governments for safety
or justice services and force them to seek recourse from foreign federal or
state government agencies.
Worse, the data available shows that more often than not Indian wom-
en do not receive justice from state and federal governments. Federal prose-
cutors regularly fail to prosecute violent crimes committed in Indian coun-
try. " According to a United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO) Study, from 2005 through 2009, U.S. Attorneys failed to prosecute
52% of all violent criminal matters referred to them for prosecution from
Indian country,' 4 including 67% of sexual abuse cases and 46% of assault
cases. 15 State prosecutors, delegated with the authority to prosecute crimes
the states." COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.06, at 85-86 (Nell Jessup New-
ton et al. eds., 2012). Federal law statutorily defines Indian country as,
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, includ-
ing rights-of-way running through the reservation[;] ...all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States[;] .. .[and] all Indian allot-
ments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished.
18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)-(c) (2006).
11. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1978)
(prohibiting tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (extend-
ing federal jurisdiction over certain crimes in Indian country); 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp. V
2012) (limiting tribal sentencing authority).
12. Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV.
709, 730-31 (2006).
13. See, e.g., Mary Clare Jalonick, DOJ Will Not Provide Indian Crime Data, NEWS
FROM INDIAN COUNTRY (Sept. 2008), http://www.indiancountrynews.com/index.php/news/9-
news- from-through-out-indian-country/4641 -doj-will-not-provide-indian-crime-data (report-
ing on a university study indicating that from 2004 to 2007 U.S. Attorneys failed to prose-
cute 50% of reservation murders, 72% of child sex crimes, and 76% of adult rapes); REPORT
TO CONGRESS: ANALYSIS OF PENALTIES FOR FEDERAL RAPE CASES 3 (1995) [hereinafter
REPORT TO CONGRESS], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and PublicAffairs/Congressional TestimonyandReport
s/Sex Offense Topics/199503_FederalRape Cases.PDF (finding that only 97 of 42,013
defendants sentenced under the federal sentencing guidelines in 1993 involved rape conduct).
14. GAO DECLINATION REPORT, supra 1, at 2-3.
15. Id. at 3. For a personal account of how U.S. Attorney's Offices handle Indian
country crimes, see Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime and the Law: Five Years
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in Indian country, also often fail to prosecute criminal cases occurring on
Indian lands. 6 These numbers exceed comparable statistics for the prosecu-
tion of violent crimes against women in state courts. A 2008 Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics Special Report indicates that state courts prosecuted 89% of
domestic sexual assault defendants, 73% of non-domestic sexual assault
defendants, and 66% of aggravated assault defendants. 7
National attention has focused on violence against Indian women with
the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)."' In re-
sponse to the epidemic of violence against Indian women, Congress enacted
and President Obama signed into law the VAWA Reauthorization Act on
March 7, 2013. " The Act included a section restoring the inherent power of
tribal governments to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdic-
tion over all persons committing specific intimate-partner related crimes in
Indian country.2" Some Republicans opposed the Senate bill because it
would restore limited criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to tribal gov-
ernments that are not bound by the United States Constitution.2' They insin-
of Scholarship on Criminal Justice in Indian Country 11-12 (Ariz. Legal Studies Discussion
Paper No. 08-26, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1287696 (describing how U.S.
Attorney's Offices do not prioritize the prosecution of Indian country crimes).
16. Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-
First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 697 (2006).
17. ERICA L. SMITH, MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, STATE COURT PROCESSING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 2 (2008), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scpdvc.pdfi The main reason given for not prosecuting domes-
tic sexual and aggravated assault cases was because the victims would not cooperate. Id. The
study also reported high rates of conviction: 98% for domestic sexual assault defendants and
87% for non-domestic sexual assault defendants. Id.
18. See, e.g., Tribes Make Push for Violence Against Women Act, FoxNEwS.COM
(Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/03/07/tribes-make-push-for-violence-
against-women-act/; Sherry Hamby, Pass a Violence Against Women Act That Protects
American Indian Women, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 30, 2012, 9:45 AM),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0730/Pass-a-Violence-Against-
Women-Act-that-protects-Amercan-lndian-women. The Violence Against Women and
Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 included an entire title devoted to ad-
dressing violence against Indian women. Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).
Title IX, Safety for Native Women, provided for an annual consultation among Indian tribes
(§ 903), analysis and research on violence against Indian women (§ 904), tracking of vio-
lence against Indian women (§ 905), grants to Indian tribal governments (§ 906), a tribal
deputy in the Office on Violence Against Women (§ 907), and enhanced criminal penalties
for firearm possessions by domestic violence perpetrators and habitual offenders (§§ 908-
909).
19. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong.
(2013).
20. Id. § 904. For a fuller description of the Violence Against Women Reauthoriza-
tion Act, see infra Part 11.
21. Caroline P. Mayhew, VA WA Tribal Provisions and Race Discrimination Argu-
ments, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (May 29, 2012),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ict-sbc/vawa-tribal-provisions-and-race-
2013:355
Jurisdiction and Human Rights Accountability 359
uated that tribal governments would infringe on the human rights of non-
Indian criminal defendants.22 Missing from this debate was any discussion
about how federal restrictions on tribal criminal jurisdiction undermine the
human rights of Indian women by denying them equal protection under the
law, judicial protection, and an effective judicial remedy.23
The recent debates over the VAWA reauthorization demonstrate the
critical importance of the concerns Professor Singel raises in her paper
about the implications of tribal governments not taking human rights issues
within their territories seriously.4 Her paper rightly emphasizes the need for
tribal governments to be accountable for and responsive to human rights
violations in their territories. In her paper, she suggests how tribal govern-
ments can collaborate with one another to provide a system of external ac-
countability for human rights abuses committed by tribal governments.25
These issues are all very important, and the scant literature on tribal gov-
ernment accountability for human rights has frequently overlooked them.
discrimination-arguments ("Following passage of the Senate bill, Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona
released a statement claiming that 'by subjecting individuals to the criminal jurisdiction of a
government from which they are excluded on account of race,' the tribal jurisdiction provi-
sion 'would quite plainly violate the Constitution's guarantees of Equal Protection and Due
Process."').
22. See Letter from the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers & the Nat'l Ass'n of
Fed. Defenders, to Sen. Harry Reid, Majority Leader, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Comm.
on the Judiciary, Sen. Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader, and Sen. Charles Grassley, Rank-
ing Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, on the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act
of 2012 (S. 1925) (Apr. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Criminal Defense Letter], available at
http://nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=24053 (arguing that enactment of the
bill to reauthorize VAWA would deprive non-Indian defendants of basic constitutional rights
with no effective remedy).
23. See AMNESTY INT'L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS
WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 28 (2006) [hereinafter MAZE OF INJUSTICE];
Women 's Rights Are Human Rights: US. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination
ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W.): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Rights & the Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. (2010) (written sub-
mission of the National Congress of American Indians Task Force on Violence Against
Women and the Indian Law Resource Center).
24. Wenona T. Singel, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, 49 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 567, 568 (2012). This is not to suggest that Indian nations have to ensure and
respect human rights in the exact same manner as other governments. HENRY J. STEINER &
PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 366
(2d ed. 2000) ("[M]any basic rights (such as the right to a fair criminal trial) allow for cultur-
ally influenced forms of implementation or realization (i.e., states are not required to use the
Anglo-American jury to assure fair a trial; states need not follow any one particular voting
system to meet the requirement of a government that represents the will of the people)."). For
a discussion of how international human rights law can be balanced with customary legal
systems, see Robin Perry, Balancing Rights or Building Rights? Reconciling the Right to Use
Customary Systems of Law with Competing Human Rights in Pursuit of Indigenous Sover-
eignty, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 71 (2011).
25. Singel, supra note 24, at 611.
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This Article agrees that American Indian or tribal govemmbnts should
be accountable for human rights in Indian country. 26 Human rights are the
rights of individual persons based on their dignity as human beings. By ac-
countable, I mean that Indian governments should be held to the same
standards of responsibility as other governments 27 under international law.
Jurisdiction, however, is a precursor to governmental accountability for
human rights, 28 and federal restrictions on tribal jurisdiction currently pre-
vent Indian nations from being accountable for human rights.
Jurisdictional arrangements in Indian country complicate human rights
accountability there. Yet the relationship between jurisdiction in Indian
country and human rights accountability has received very little scholarly
attention.29 The few articles on tribal governments and human rights focus
predominantly on issues of tribal sovereign immunity and the Indian Civil
Rights Act.3" Further, while a robust body of literature exists on the rights of
indigenous peoples, it deals almost exclusively with the group rights of In-
dian nations to land and self-determination.31 This Article seeks to close this
gap in the literature by exploring fully the relationship between federal re-
strictions on tribal self-determination and the ability of Indian governments
to respond to human rights violations, especially violence-based human
rights violations.
This Article shows how federal restrictions on tribal governments
make tribal accountability for human rights violations based on private vio-
lence almost impossible. Private acts of violence, including but not limited
to domestic violence, murder, and sexual abuse, undermine international
26. Id. at 567-69.
27. Many standards of governmental accountability for human rights come from
international law and this Article uses international human rights law as a framework for
understanding governmental accountability for human rights.
28. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, 1, adopted
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (applying the ICCPR only to people
subject to the State's jurisdiction).
29. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1049 (2007).
30. See, e.g., Singel, supra note 24, at 567-69; Greg Rubio, Reclaiming Indian Civil
Rights: The Application of International Human Rights Law to Tribal Disenrollment Actions,
II OR. REV. INT'LL. 1 (2009).
31. See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, The Anomaly of Citizenship for Indigenous Rights,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM 217 (Shareen Hertel &
Kathryn Libal eds., 2011) ("The struggle for indigenous rights throughout history has not
been only-or even primarily-to gain rights for native people as individuals separate from
tribal communities, but to secure their right to self-determination as political entities distinct
from states."); Robert T. Coulter, The UN. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
A Historic Change in International Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 539 (2009); Robert B. Porter, A
Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 899 (1998).
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human rights to life and security of the person.32 As discussed in Section
I.B, these private acts breach international human rights law, and govern-
ments incur responsibility for them when the government fails to take rea-
sonable measures to prevent or punish the injurious acts.33 Indian govern-
ments cannot be accountable for human rights violations when federal law
restricts their legal capacity to take reasonable measures to prevent and pun-
ish private acts of violence.
This Article argues that restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations is a
condition precedent for establishing a basis for tribal accountability for hu-
man rights. It agrees with proposals made by scholars, policymakers, and
tribal advocates to restore to Indian nations the jurisdiction to prevent, pros-
ecute, and punish crimes that occur in Indian country.3" It applauds the re-
cently enacted VAWA Reauthorization Act as a step towards restoring ju-
risdiction to Indian nations and increasing tribal accountability for human
rights.35 This Article illuminates the connection between such jurisdictional
restorations and human rights accountability in Indian country. Because
several recent articles have convincingly responded to the constitutional
arguments for and against proposals to restore criminal jurisdiction to Indi-
an nations,36 this Article will only discuss the issue from the perspective of
human rights accountability.
32. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (111) A, U.N.
Doe. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] ("Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and the security of person."); ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 6 (right to life); American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official Rec., OEA/Ser.L./V./I.23, doc.
21 rev. 6 (1948) [hereinafter American Declaration], reprinted in Basic Documents Pertain-
ing to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser. L.V/tI.82, doc. 6 rev. 1, at 14
(1992) (right to life, liberty and security of the person).
33. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs, and the Responsibil-
ity of States, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 15-24 (1990).
34. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 15, at 24 ("Federal policy should seek to restore
tribal capacities for handling some or all of these functions."); MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER,
ADDRESSING THE EPIDEMIC OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDIAN COUNTRY BY RESTORING
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 7-9 (2009), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Fletcher/ 20lssue%2OBrief.pdf.
35. While the passage of the VAWA Reauthorization Act is laudable, real change in
Indian country will depend on its implementation and the allocation of sufficient resources
for its implementation.
36. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 7-9; Letter from Law Professors, to Sen.
Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm., Sen. Charles Grassley, Ranking Member, S.
Judiciary Comm., Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Judiciary Comm., and Rep. John Co-
nyers, Jr., Ranking Member, H. Judiciary Comm. on the Constitutionality of Tribal Govern-
ment Provisions in VAWA Authorization (Apr. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Law Professors Let-
ter], available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/201 2/04/vawa-letter- from-law-
professors-tribal-provisions.pdf; M. Brent Leonhard, Closing a Gap in Indian Country Jus-
tice: Oliphant, Lara, and the DOJ's Proposed Fix, 28 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST.
117(2012).
Michigan State Law Review
In arguing that restoring jurisdiction is a precursor to tribal govern-
ment accountability for human rights, this Article highlights the relationship
between individual human rights and indigenous peoples', or group, rights.
Indigenous peoples' rights are rights held by the indigenous people or
groups of indigenous peoples. Foremost among indigenous peoples' rights
is the right of self-determination. The right of self-determination empowers
indigenous peoples, including Indian nations in the United States, to ensure
and respect the individual human rights of their people.37
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I uses international human
rights law to show how federal restrictions on tribal authority undermine
human rights accountability in Indian country. Section I.A describes the
current jurisdictional arrangement and its consequences, what I call the en-
forcement environment, in Indian country. Section I.B provides necessary
background on international human rights law, including the obligations
placed on governments to respect human rights and the circumstances under
which governments are responsible for private violence under international
human rights law. Then in Section I.C, I show how the enforcement envi-
ronment prevents tribal government accountability for human rights viola-
tions based on private violence in Indian country. Finally, I suggest that the
United States cannot meet its obligations under international law as long as
the current enforcement environment in Indian country remains in place.
Part II argues that restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations is a condition
precedent to tribal human rights accountability and may increase human
rights accountability in Indian country.
I. THE ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIAN COUNTRY
This Part shows how federal restrictions on tribal authority undermine
human rights accountability in Indian country. It starts by explaining the
federal barriers to tribal criminal authority in Indian country in Section I.A.
This background on tribal criminal jurisdiction is essential to understanding
the consequences of these barriers for human rights accountability in Indian
country. Section I.B helps us to understand how the federal limits on tribal
criminal authority complicate human rights accountability by summarizing
the standards for government responsibility for private acts of violence un-
37. Robert T. Coulter, The Law of Self-Determination and the United Nations Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 15 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 3
(2010) ("The right of self-determination was and still is centrally important to indigenous
peoples, because it is essential to the preservation and well-being of indigenous cultures and
societies and is necessary for the enjoyment of all other human rights."); PATRICK
THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 96 (2002) (explaining that universal
realization of the right of self-determination "is a fundamental condition for the effective
guarantee and observation of human rights").
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der international human rights law. Section I.C then explains how federal
barriers to tribal criminal jurisdiction undermine human rights accountabil-
ity in Indian country.
A. The Enforcement Environment in Indian Country
The United States government has created complex jurisdictional rules
that thwart the ability of tribal governments to exercise criminal jurisdiction
in Indian country." The United States government has always recognized
Indian nations as separate governments with inherent sovereignty predating
European arrival.39 As part of their inherent sovereignty, Indian nations ex-
ercise authority over their land and people. " The United States, however,
has unilaterally asserted the power to limit the governmental authority of
Indian nations.4 The federal government has exercised this authority to
modify the powers of self-government that Indian nations inherently pos-
sess.
4 2
The current legal structure governing criminal jurisdiction exemplifies
how the federal government has greatly limited inherent tribal jurisdictional
authority and replaced it with complex and confusing jurisdictional ar-
rangements in Indian country.43 Criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is
split among three governments: state, federal, and tribal. The authority to
investigate and prosecute crimes that occur in Indian country depends on
various factors, including the nature of the crime, the identity of the perpe-
trator, and the identity of the victim. These various factors complicate the
analysis for determining which government has jurisdiction, and thus, is
38. See supra note 10 for a definition of Indian country.
39. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (stating that Indian
tribes have long been recognized as sovereign entities "'possessing attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and their territory"' (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544, 557 (1975))); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 580 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
40. Sovereignty in the context of Indian nations in the United States differs signifi-
cantly from the sovereignty of states internationally. For a fuller discussion of these differ-
ences, see Coulter, supra note 37, at 11.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
42. The United States has relied on the plenary power doctrine to, inter alia, divest
Indian nations of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1978), reduce reservation boundaries without the Indian nation's
consent or compensation, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594 (1977), abrogate
treaties with Indian nations, United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 423-24
(1980), and divest tribal civil jurisdiction, Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566
(1981).
43. MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 23, at 27-28.
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responsible for investigating and prosecuting the crime.' Consider, for ex-
ample, the multiple difficulties faced by the Indian woman, who, like the
majority of Indian and Alaska Native women, has experienced sexual or
physical violence.45 Simply to report the crime to the proper authorities, she
must know whether the crime occurred in Indian country, whether the of-
fense is considered a major crime under federal law, and whether the perpe-
trator's status is Indian or non-Indian. If she calls the wrong authority, say
the state instead of the tribal police, they may refuse to respond to the call
and fail to refer her to the proper authorities. If she does not know whether
she was in Indian country when the attack occurred or the Indian/non-Indian
status of her attacker, she may not know to which authority-state, federal,
or tribal-to report the crime.46
If the answers to these questions are determinable and not disputed,
then jurisdiction depends on federal law.47 According to the United States
Supreme Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, Indian nations have no
criminal authority when the alleged offender is non-Indian." Only the fed-
eral government has jurisdiction if the alleged offender is non-Indian,49 un-
less it has statutorily delegated such authority to a state (in which case, then
only the state may have jurisdiction). Provisions recently enacted as part
of the VAWA Reauthorization Act of 2013 create one limited exception to
the general rule that Indian nations have no criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. Section 904 of the Act restores to participating tribal governments
authority over domestic violence, dating violence, and violations of protec-
tion orders when the defendant resides in the Indian country of the prosecut-
ing tribe, is employed by the prosecuting tribe, or is the spouse or estab-
44. Id. ("The end result can sometimes be so confusing that no one intervenes, leav-
ing victims without legal protection or redress and resulting in impunity for the perpetrators,
especially non-Native offenders who commit crimes on tribal land.").
45. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 8; TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 2.
46. For a fuller discussion of enforcement problems related to land status, see MAZE
OF INJUSTICE, supra note 23, at 33-34.
47. For a fuller discussion of the federal laws governing criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country, see Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-
Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779 (2006).
48. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (holding that
tribal criminal authority over non-Indians was inconsistent with the tribes' status as domes-
tic, dependent nations).
49. Id. § 1152.
50. The United States government has statutorily granted states criminal jurisdiction
in Indian country on multiple occasions. See, e.g., id. § 1162. The most commonly referred to
grant of such authority is PL-280, which authorized five (later six) states to assume criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006)). For a fuller discussion of PL-280, see
Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975).
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lished intimate partner of a tribal member." Participating tribal govern-
ments will not be able to prosecute crimes between two non-Indians or
crimes occurring outside Indian country. 2 All criminal proceedings under §
904 must provide the defendant with all rights required under the United
States Constitution. 3 Indian nations and the DOJ are currently in the initial
phases of implementing tribal jurisdiction over crimes of domestic vio-
lence.54 Once they start exercising this special domestic violence jurisdic-
tion, Indian nations will have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal gov-
ernment, the state government, or both over a limited number of criminal
offenses by non-Indians."
A different rule prevails if the offender is Indian. Under federal law,
Indian nations generally share criminal jurisdiction with the federal gov-
ernment when the alleged offender is Indian. 6 The Indian nation may have
exclusive criminal jurisdiction if an Indian commits a misdemeanor against
an Indian.
As if these rules are not confusing enough, the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA) further complicates jurisdictional authority in Indian country by
limiting the sentencing authority of tribal courts. Tribal courts may only
sentence offenders to a maximum of one year imprisonment and/or a maxi-
mum fine of $5,000.00 unless the Indian nation has provided certain protec-
tions to the accused.57 Once a tribal court provides these protections, it may
sentence offenders to up to three years imprisonment and/or a maximum
fine of $15,000.00 per offense with a total consecutive sentence of nine
years for multiple offenses in a single criminal proceeding.58 For tribal
courts to exercise this enhanced sentencing authority, they must provide the
defendant all of the following: (1) a right of effective assistance of counsel
at least equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution; (2) li-
censed legal defense counsel at the expense of the tribe; (3) a presiding trib-
al judge that is licensed and law trained; (4) criminal laws, rules of evi-
dence, and rules of criminal procedure that are publicly available; and (5) an
audio or video recording of the criminal trial. 9 A recent study by the GAO
found that most tribal courts lack the funding and resources to implement
51. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong.
(2013).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Pilot Project for Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes of Domestic Violence, 78 Fed.
Reg. 115, 35,961 (June 14, 2013) (announcing the creation of a pilot project to implement §
908(b)(2) of the VAWA Reauthorization Act of 2013).
55. Id.
56. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (2006).
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B), (c) (Supp. V 2012).
58. Id. § 1302(b)-(c).
59. Id. § 1302(c).
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this enhanced sentencing authority.6" In effect, the limitations on tribal sen-
tencing authority in ICRA make the federal government-or in cases of
delegation, the state government-the only government with authority to
prosecute felonies in Indian country. 6
At first glance, these restrictions on tribal criminal jurisdiction may
seem unproblematic from a strictly public-safety perspective. The Indian
nation's lack of jurisdiction may not matter as long as the federal and state
governments are exercising the authority claimed by (or delegated to) them.
The problem is that the Oliphant decision did not place any responsibility
on the United States government or the state governments to prosecute non-
Indian offenders on Indian lands. In the words of the United States Civil
Rights Commission, "[T]he decision only dealt with limitations to tribal
power, not the federal responsibility to compensate for those limitations
based on the trust relationship. The Court did not require the federal gov-
ernment to protect tribes or prosecute non-Indian offenders who commit
crimes on tribal lands."62 As a result, the federal government has devoted
few resources to policing and prosecuting crimes in Indian country. The
DOJ reports "that tribes have between 55 and 75 percent of the resources
available to non-Indian communities. 63
Not surprisingly, prosecutions of violent crimes on Indian lands have
historically been few and far between. The data available show that more
often than not federal and state prosecutors fail to prosecute violent crimes
committed on Indian lands. 4 The statistics merit repeating: According to a
GAO Study, from 2005 through 2009, U.S. Attorneys failed to prosecute
52% of all violent criminal matters referred to them for prosecution, includ-
60. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-658R, TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER
ACT: NONE OF THE SURVEYED TRIBES REPORTED EXERCISING THE NEW SENTENCING
AUTHORITY, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COULD CLARIFY TRIBAL ELIGIBILITY FOR
CERTAIN GRANT FUNDS 3 (2012) [hereinafter, GAO REPORT ON TLOA], available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591213.pdf. The report also emphasized that the Department
of Justice needed to clarify tribal eligibility for certain grant funds so that tribal governments
could apply for the resources they need to improve their legal systems. Id. at 3-4. It suggests
a circularity in federal policy towards Indian governments, namely that policymakers refuse
to fund adequately tribal governments and then use this lack of resources as a rationale for
not restoring authority to them.
61. Washburn, supra note 47, at 822 n.245.
62. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET
NEEDS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 68 (2003), available at
http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/aquietcrisis.pdf.
63. Id. at 77; MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 23, at 42.
64. See, e.g., Jalonick, supra note 13 (reporting on a university study indicating that
from 2004 to 2007 U.S. Attorneys failed to prosecute 50% of murder cases, 72% of child sex
crimes, and 76% of adult rapes committed on Indian lands); REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 13 (finding that only 0.2% of 42,013 federal cases sentenced under the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines in 1993 involved rape conduct). For comparable data on state prosecutors, see
generally Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 16; MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 23, at 42.
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ing 67% of sexual abuse cases and 46% of assault cases occurring on Indian
lands.65 The refusal of U.S. Attorneys to report declinations and share in-
formation on prosecutions with tribal governments (and victims) until fed-
eral law mandated they do so in 2010 compounded the problem of non-
prosecution in Indian country because tribal governments with concurrent
jurisdiction were often discouraged from prosecuting the same crimes. 66
Recently, some tribal governments have taken proactive approaches to their
concurrent criminal jurisdiction, prosecuting all crimes within their jurisdic-
tion regardless of whether the federal or state government intended to pros-
ecute or not.
67
B. Government Accountability for Private Acts of Violence Under Interna-
tional Law
In this Section, I explain government accountability for private acts of
violence under international human rights law. International human rights
law provides us with a standard for understanding when governments are
accountable for human rights violations. International human rights norms
apply to the acts of subnational and national governments with the responsi-
bility of violations at the national level.68 While Indian nations may not be
responsible for human rights violations under international law,69 these
norms reflect growing international consensus on how governments should
respect and ensure human rights. As such, they provide guidance to and can
be used by tribal governments seeking to defend human rights and prevent
65. GAO DECLINATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. Various reasons have been given
for the failure of the federal government to investigate and punish violent crimes in Indian
country. Then U.S. Attorney for North Dakota Drew Wrigley asserted that lack of jurisdic-
tion and lack of evidence were the main reasons that U.S. Attorneys declined to prosecute
cases. Examining Federal Declinations to Prosecute Crimes in Indian Country: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 22-25 (2008) (statement of Hon. Drew H.
Wrigley, U.S. Attorney, District of North Dakota). Former U.S. Attorney for the District of
Minnesota Tom Heffelfinger explained that insufficient evidence is a problem due to juris-
dictional barriers, delays, remote locations of Indian tribes, and lack of resources, including
police resources, crime laboratories, and sexual assault nurses. Id. at 37-39 (statement of
Thomas B. Heffelfinger, Partner, Best and Flanagan, LLP). He also noted that U.S. Attorneys
"work under difficult conditions with extremely large case loads." Id. at 37. Former assistant
U.S. Attorney Kevin Washburn attributes poor prosecution rates in Indian country to the low
priority given to Indian country cases. Washburn, supra note 12, at 718-19.
66. Jalonick, supra note 13.
67. It is difficult to discern whether tribes are more effectively and more frequently
prosecuting crimes in Indian country because many tribal governments lack the resources to
record such information.
68. Risa E. Kaufman, State and Local Commissions as Sites for Domestic Human
Rights Implementation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM,
supra note 31, at 90
69. Singel, supra note 24, at 590.
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human rights abuses in their territories. 0 Further, as the national govern-
ment, the United States could be responsible for human rights violations
caused by private acts of violence due to the enforcement environment in
Indian country.7
The protection of human rights is almost universally accepted as part
of the domain of international law.72 International human rights law general-
ly consists of the rights in international human rights treaties and customary
international law.73 Human rights treaties usually recognize rights of indi-
viduals and impose obligations on state parties to ensure and respect those
rights.74 Ratification of a treaty binds the state to fulfill the legal obligations
agreed to in its terms.7" Multilateral treaties frequently codify existing inter-
national norms.76 A state cannot avoid its obligations to abide by these
70. As envisioned by the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
tribal governments should be held to the same standards as other governments. Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 34, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration] ("Indigenous peoples have the
right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive
customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist,
juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards."). The
International Law Association Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples interprets
Article 34 to include
human rights guarantees under both customary international law and relevant trea-
ties ratified by the States concerned, provided that any limitations to the exercise of
indigenous peoples' rights are consistent with Article 46(2) UNDRIP, i.e. that they
are "non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting
the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society."
Conference Report, Rights of Indigenous Peoples Comm., Int'l L. Ass'n, Sofia Conference 3
(2012) [hereinafter ILA] (alteration in original) (quoting U.N. Declaration, supra, art. 46(2)),
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/227B560E-FOF5-4773-
BECC974CFC6AI I B8.
71. This Article only considers the question of whether the United States govern-
ment could be found responsible under international law for private acts of violence in Indian
country in the abstract. Full consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article and
would depend on the specific facts of the case involved and the international treaty implicat-
ed in that case. For this reason, I focus on the general standard of due diligence applied to
private acts of violence under international law.
72. See HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPTS, CONTESTS, CONTINGENCIES 2 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 2001).
73. See id. at 96.
74. See id.
75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("Pacta sunt servanda"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 321 (1987) ("Every international agreement in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."). In the United States, ratifica-
tion is an executive action that can include significant reservations to the treaty. See U.S.
CONST. art. I1, §§ 1-2; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 314 & cmt.
a.
76. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (7th ed. 2008).
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norms by refusing to ratify multilateral treaties because these norms already
exist as customary international law.77 Customary international law emerges
from widely adopted, actual state practices." Norms of customary interna-
tional law are formed through consistent and generalized state practice, per-
formed out of a sense of legal obligation.79 States may be bound by custom-
ary international law as long as the practice is accepted as a legal obligation
by widespread consensus, and the state has not persistently objected to the
practice. 8o
Customary international law and treaties protect an expansive list of
individual rights. These individual rights include, inter alia, life and security
of the person,8' non-discrimination, 2 access to justice,83 and equal protec-
tion.84 Recently, with the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Declaration), understandings of human rights
have expanded to include the collective or group rights of indigenous peo-
ples as well as their individual rights.85 The Declaration reaffirms that in-
digenous peoples as individuals and groups have all human rights and fun-
damental freedoms under international human rights law. 6 For example, it
77. Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000).
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(2); BROWNLIE, supra
note 76, at 6-10.
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(2); BROWNLIE, supra note
76, at 6-10.
80. But see Roach v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
3/87, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 54 (1986-1987) (explaining that a state's persistent
objections cannot overcome a peremptory norm of international law).
81. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 6 (right to life).
82. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 26 (equal protection under the law); Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD].
83. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2(3) (effective remedy); id. art. 26 (equal
protection under the law); id. art. 14 (equality before the courts); ICERD, supra note 82, art.
5(a) (equal treatment in the administration of justice); id. art. 6 (effective protection and
remedies).
84. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2(3) (effective remedy); id. art. 26 (equal
protection under the law); id. art. 14 (equality before the courts); ICERD, supra note 82, art.
5(a) (equal treatment in the administration of justice); id. art. 6 (effective protection and
remedies).
85. Coulter, supra note 31, at 547. The United Nations General Assembly voted 143
to 4 in support of the Declaration. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly
Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples; "Major Step Forward" Towards Hu-
man Rights for All, Says President, U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007), available
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm. The four states that voted
against the Declaration-the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia-have all
since endorsed it. Id.; Gale Courey Toensing, UN Declaration's One-Year Anniversary:
"Much to Celebrate, Much More to Be Done," INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Dec. 12, 2011),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/article/un-declaration /25e2 /2580 /2599s-
one-year-anniversary-much-to-celebrate-much-more-to-be-done-66108.
86. U.N. Declaration, supra note 70, art. 1.
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recognizes the collective rights of indigenous peoples to, among other
things, self-determination,87 traditional indigenous property rights and sys-
tems of property law,88 honoring of treaty rights, 9 and conservation of the
environment.9 ° The Declaration also affirms specific rights of indigenous
individuals, including rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty
and security of the person," freedom from forced assimilation or destruction
of their culture,92 ability to belong to an indigenous community/nation,93
freedom from violence against women and children,94 education rights,95
labor rights,96 and mental and physical health rights.97
International human rights treaties place positive obligations on states
and attempt to hold them legally responsible for breaches of these obliga-
tions. "Generally, human rights treaties establish the obligation to respect all
the rights they recognize in favor of all individuals" under the state's juris-
diction.8 Thus, the United States is bound to respect the rights in treaties it
has ratified, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All
87. See, e.g., id. arts. 3, 4, 34.
88. Id. art. 26. Article 26 states,
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands,
territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or
other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise
acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and
resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs,
traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.
Id.
89. Id. art. 37 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and
enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with
States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and
other constructive agreements.").
90. Id. art. 29 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection
of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources.
States shall establish and implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such
conservation and protection, without discrimination.").
91. Id. art. 7(1).
92. Id. art. 8.
93. Id. art. 9.
94. Id. art. 22.
95. Id. art. 14(2).
96. Id. art. 17.
97. Id. art. 24(2).
98. Leonardo A. Crippa, Multilateral Development Banks and Human Rights Re-
sponsibility, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 531, 545 (2010).
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Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).99 Federal or national govern-
ments answer internationally for human rights violations even when they
have delegated implementation to a subnational or local government.0 °
Even though Indian nations are inherent sovereign governments and not
subnational governments, more likely than not, the United States govern-
ment must answer internationally for breaches of human rights treaties in
Indian country0' because as domestic, dependent nations, Indian nations
cannot enter into international human rights treaties.'0 2
Governments can be responsible for their inaction, or failure to protect
human rights, as well as their infringements on human rights.0 3 In some
situations, treaty-based international human rights organizations have held
governments responsible for their failure to protect individuals from human
rights violations perpetrated by private actors.l'" In this respect, internation-
99. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR Senate Document];
ICERD, supra note 82.
100. Kaufman, supra note 68, at 89-90 ("As Louis Henkin noted, international law
allows the federal government to leave implementation of human rights treaty provisions to
the states, although the United States remains internationally responsible for a state's failure
to implement a treaty obligation .... ").
101. International human rights bodies have criticized the United States government
for human rights issues in Indian country. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Concluding Observations: United States of America, 72d Sess., Feb. 18-Mar.
7, 2008, 9 26, U.N. Doc. CERD/CIUSA/CO/6 (May 8, 2008).
102. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 518 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. I, 17 (1831).
103. Shelton, supra note 33, at 17 ("International practice has long made clear that
both acts and omissions may give rise to international liability, depending on the duty im-
posed under international law.").
104. See, e.g., Vehisquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1 147, 182, 185 (July 29, 1988) (holding Honduras responsible for
Veldsquez-Rodriguez's disappearance and death when the actual parties responsible were
unknown but suspected to be military personnel); Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, OEA/Ser.L./V/1I.142, doc. 11, 11 2, 199 (2011)
(finding that local law enforcements failure to prevent domestic violence by enforcing a valid
protection order constituted discrimination and denied women equal protection and judicial
protection); Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VI11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at iii, iv, 48 (stating that the
state bears responsibility if authorities knew or ought to have known that criminal acts of a
third party posed a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual and the
authorities failed to take reasonable measures to avoid that risk); Rep. of the Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 32d Sess., Jan. 10-Jan. 28, 2005, Views of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Under Article 7, Para-
graph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, 9.3-.4, U.N. Doc. A/60/38, Annex IIl; GAOR, 60th Sess.,
Supp. No. 38 (2005) [hereinafter Article 7 Report] (finding Hungary violated a woman's
right to security of the person by failing to prevent ongoing violence against her by her for-
mer common law husband).
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al human rights law places more obligations on the United States to respect
human rights than does domestic constitutional law in the United States. 05
Several human rights treaties impose obligations on states to prevent,
investigate, and punish acts committed by private actors.0 6 For example,
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states that each state party "undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdic-
tion the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of
any kind."' 7 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has interpreted Article
2(1) as obligating states to protect individuals from private acts that violate
Covenant rights.' 8 While its views are not definitive, the HRC's interpreta-
tion suggests that a state's failure to take appropriate measures to prevent,
punish, investigate, or redress the harm caused by a private act could lead to
a violation of the ICCPR because the state did not respect and ensure human
rights. "0 Similarly, under Article 5(b) of the ICERD, state parties undertake
to guarantee the right of everyone in the enjoyment of "[t]he right to securi-
ty of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm,
whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual, group or
institution."" 0 Other human rights treaties signed but not ratified by the
United States, including the United Nations Convention on the Elimination
105. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
191, 195 (1989); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 750-51, 760 (2005). For a
fuller discussion of this point, see Shelton, supra note 33, at 26-34.
106. ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2(1); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women art. 2, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13
[hereinafter CEDAW]; ICERD, supra note 82, art. 2.
107. ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2(1).
108. Human Rights Comm., The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
States Parties to the Covenant, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2I/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004)
("However the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be
fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Cove-
nant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons .... ").
109. Id. The Human Rights Committee has also interpreted Article 7 as imposing
obligations on state parties to prevent private acts. Office of the High Comm'r for Human
Rights, Human Rights Comm., Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment), 2, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/lI/Rev.9 (Vol. 1) (Mar. 10,
1992) ("The aim of the provisions of article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is to protect both the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the
individual. It is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative
and other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether
inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a
private capacity.").
110. ICERD, supra note 82, art. 5(b); see also id. art. 2 ("Each State Party undertakes
not to sponsor, defend or support racial discrimination by any persons or organizations ...
[and] shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as
required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization.").
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of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)"' l and the Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women, "2 also obligate states to prevent violence com-
mitted by private actors.
These treaties do not hold states responsible for every private act of
violence committed within their territory. States are only responsible for
private acts of violence when it is "possible to attribute to the state some
conduct with respect to the [private violence] that implies the non-
performance of an international duty.""' 3 A breach of international law by a
state requires "'conduct consisting of an action or omission [that]: (a) is
attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach
of an international obligation of the State.""' 4
Treaty-based international and regional human rights organizations,
including the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination (CERD Committee), the European Court on Human Rights, and
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, have interpreted these
human rights treaties and customary law as requiring states to act with due
diligence when responding to private acts of violence.' ' Due diligence
places a duty on states to exercise due care."6 This "duty encompasses an
obligation to marshal the full apparatus of the state to prevent, investigate,
punish and compensate."" 
7
111. CEDAW, supra note 106, art. 2; accord Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women, 11 th Sess., Violence Against Women, 9, U.N. Doc.
A/47/38; GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1993) (explaining that states may be responsible
for private acts of violence "if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of
rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence").
112. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women art. 7, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534.
113. Shelton, supra note 33, at 21.
114. Robert P. Bamidge, Jr., The Due Diligence Principle Under International Law,
8 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REv. 81, 89 (preprint 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Rep. of
the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/1 0; GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND
COMMENTARIES 61 (2002)), available at
http://academia.edu/430200/FheDueDiligence Principle UnderInternational Law.
115. See, e.g., Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 172 (July 29, 1988); Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 32-33; Article 7 Report, supra note 104, 9.2. The use of due diligence by treaty-
based human rights organization is an extension of the concept with regard to the protection
of aliens. Shelton, supra note 33, at 21-22.
116. Stephanie Farrior, State Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses by Non-State
Actors, 92 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 299, 302 (1998).
117. Id.
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Under the due diligence standard, a state is not responsible for purely
private harm but is liable if "'it displayed, in the conduct of its organs or
officials, patent or manifest negligence in taking the measures which are
normally taken in the particular circumstances to prevent or punish the inju-
rious acts.""' 8 In other words, "[d]ue diligence consists of the reasonable
measures of prevention that a well-administered government could be ex-
pected to exercise under similar circumstances.""' 9 While the government is
not liable for the initial harm, it "cannot ignore a wrong even where it has
no initial responsibility."' 2° A state cannot delegate its due diligence obliga-
tions even in situations where another state or a non-state actor performs
certain functions. 121
As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights explained in its land-
mark decision holding the Honduran government responsible for the disap-
pearance of Manfredo Velasquez:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly im-
putable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because
the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsi-
bility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due dili-
gence to prevent the violation or to respond to it .... 122
Even though the Velasquez case involved state action that was diffi-
cult to prove, rather than non-state action, some treaty-based human rights
organizations, including the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, have interpreted its language
broadly to apply the due diligence standard to human rights violations by
private actors. 123 These organizations have found the state liable internation-
ally for private acts of violence when the state's failure to act with due dili-
118. Shelton, supra note 33, at 23 (quoting F.V. GARCiA-AMADOR, Louis B. SOHN &
R.R. BAXTER, RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO
ALIENS 27 (1974)).
119. Id.; see also Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a
Human Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1124-25 (1995) (discussing a state's failure to
prosecute as making it complicit in the human rights violation).
120. Shelton, supra note 33, at 24.
121. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences,
The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, T 34,
Comm'n on Human Rights, Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20,
2006) [hereinafter UNSRVAW Report] (by Yakin Erttirk).
122. Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 4, 172, 182 (July 29, 1988).
123. See, e.g., id. 2, 182; Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 32-
33; Article 7 Report, supra note 104, 9.2. The use of due diligence by a treaty-based human
fights organization is an extension of the concept with regard to the protection of aliens.
Shelton, supra note 33, at 21-22.
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gence undermines the rights contained in a human rights instrument.'24 They
have found states "responsible under a due diligence standard for inaction or
inadequate action in a range of situations, including failure to provide police
protection to prevent private violence, failure to investigate or to investigate
adequately killings by private individuals, and failure to punish adequately
or punish at all."'25
In the context of private acts of violence, treaty-based organizations
have interpreted due diligence to require that governments take actions to
prevent future crimes, to investigate crimes that have been committed, to
prosecute perpetrators fairly, and to make reparations to victims.'26 While
the application of the due diligence standard is case specific, treaty-based
organizations have provided some guidance on what states have to do to
prevent and investigate private acts of violence with due diligence. The duty
to prevent does not obligate the state to prevent all human rights abuses, but
to "promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any violations
are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the
punishment of those responsible and the obligation to indemnify the victims
for damages."'27 The duty to investigate means that states should seriously
investigate human rights violations so that private persons or groups are not
allowed to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of human rights.'28
124. Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 32-33, 45; Article 7
Report, supra note 104, 9.2-.3, .6; cf Thomas & Beasley, supra note 119, at 1134.
125. See Farrior, supra note 116, at 302.
126. See Christina Misner-Pollard, Domestic Violence in Russia: Is Current Law
Meeting the Needs of Victims and the Obligations of Human Rights Instruments, 3 COLUM. J.
E. EUR. L. 145, 174 (2009) (citing U.N. Div. for the Advancement of Women in Collabora-
tion with U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Rep. of the Expert Group Meeting, May 17-May
20, 2005, Good Practices in Combating and Eliminating Violence Against Women 4 (2005),
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-gp-
2005/docs/FlNALREPORT.goodpractices.pdf; see also UNSRVAW Report, supra note
121, at 1 26-27; Velbsquez-Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 174 ("The State
has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the
means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its
jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to en-
sure the victim adequate compensation."); Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, OEA/Ser.L./V/1.142, doc. 11 1 126 (2011)
("[I]ntemational bodies have consistently established that a State may incur international
responsibility for failing to act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, sanction, and offer
reparations for acts of violence against women; a duty which may apply to actions committed
by private actors in certain circumstances.").
127. VelAsquez-Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 175.
128. Id. 1176 ("The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a viola-
tion of the rights protected by the Convention. If the State apparatus acts in such a way that
the violation goes unpunished and the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored
as soon as possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure the free and full
exercise of those rights to the persons within its jurisdiction."); id. 177 ("Where the acts of
private parties that violate the Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties are
Michigan State Law Review
In cases of domestic violence, these organizations have found that due dili-
gence requires the state to take reasonable actions to protect women and
children from violence when the state knew or should have known they
were in "a situation of risk." 129
Treaty-based organizations have used the due diligence standard to re-
quire states to take affirmative action to prevent, investigate, and punish
private acts of violence. Due diligence provides a standard by which to
measure the performance of governments in responding to human rights
abuses caused by private acts of violence. States may be liable for human
rights violations when they fail to investigate crimes adequately, punish
perpetrators, and make reparations to victims.
C. Federal Barriers to Tribal Criminal Authority Undermine Human Rights
Accountability
This Section demonstrates how, based on the due diligence standard
for government accountability under international human rights law, the
enforcement environment in Indian country impedes human rights account-
ability because tribal governments lack the authority to prevent, investigate,
and punish private acts of violence, and the only governments with the au-
thority to prevent, investigate, and punish these acts do not do so. Private
acts of violence that occur in Indian country are not regularly investigated
or punished, leading to human rights violations, in Indian country, especial-
ly against women. 3 My analysis suggests that the current enforcement en-
vironment compounds rather than alleviates human rights violations occur-
ring in Indian country. As a result, the enforcement environment prevents
Indian nations from acting as human rights defenders and exposes the Unit-
aided in a sense by the government, thereby making the State responsible on the international
plane."); Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, 178.
129. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, 133.
In the context of violence against women, some scholars describe the due diligence standard
as requiring the state to prevent the systematic, discriminatory enforcement of criminal laws.
See, e.g., Misner-Pollard, supra note 126, at 174; Thomas & Beasley, supra note 119, at
1124-25.
130. 1 use violence against women as an example for two reasons: first, the debate
over restoring tribal criminal authority has focused on this context; and second, an important
segment of the international community has recognized violence against women as a human
rights violation in similar situations. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.I 11, doc. 20 rev. 77 2, 44 (2000) (finding
that Brazil had violated the petitioner's right to justice under Article 25 of the American
Convention on Human Rights because it had failed to investigate properly and prosecute
Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes' husband after he tried to kill her and left her paralyzed);
Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, 1 150.
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ed States government to potential legal responsibility for private acts of
violence occurring in Indian country.' 3
The enforcement environment undermines the human rights accounta-
bility of Indian nations for violence-based human rights in Indian country
because it greatly restricts the ability of tribal governments to prevent, in-
vestigate, or punish most private acts of violence. While most routine vio-
lent crimes are not necessarily human rights abuses, the failure of the state
to prevent, punish, or investigate private acts of violence can lead to breach-
es of international human rights obligations.'32 For example, failure to inves-
tigate and punish private acts of violence may lead to the violation of the
victim's rights to life, equal protection, or a judicial remedy under the
ICCPR, the ICERD, or the American Declaration. "'
Without the power to prevent, investigate, or punish most violent
crimes, Indian nations cannot exercise due diligence to ensure and respect
human rights as required by international human rights law. Consider, for
example, the experience of an Indian woman raped by a non-Indian in Indi-
an country. As if her rape is not traumatic enough, she probably has no legal
recourse against her attacker from her Indian nation unless her attacker was
her intimate partner and her Indian nation has met the requirements for spe-
cial domestic violence jurisdiction under VAWA. Further, the United States
or the state government will most likely refuse to investigate and punish the
rapist. 4 This scenario is all too common in Indian country. It demonstrates
how the enforcement environment, which largely prevents the Indian nation
from acting and allows the federal and state governments to respond inade-
quately to the private act of violence, leads to the violation of the women's
rights to equal protection under the law and an effective judicial remedy, in
addition to the violation of her right to be free from violence. Further, the
tribal government cannot act with due diligence in response to the private
act of violence because it is severely limited in its ability to prevent subse-
131. Increasingly, regional and international human rights bodies have held govern-
ments responsible for similar failures to prevent and punish violence-based human rights
abuses. See, e.g., Fernandes, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 54/01, rev.
44; Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, 170; Opuz v. Tur-
key, App. No. 33401/02, 2009-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 38 (2009),
http:/Ihudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1 -92945# {"fulltext":["Opuz v.
Turkey"],"itemid":["001-92945"] }.
132. See supra Section I.B.
133. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 2(3) (stating that each state party has an
obligation to ensure effective remedies to victims of human rights violations); id. art. 14
(equality before the courts); id. art. 26 (equal protection under the law); ICERD, supra note
82, art. 5(a) (equality before the law and equal treatment before tribunals); id. art. 6 (right to
effective protection and remedies); American Declaration, supra note 32, art. II (equal pro-
tection before the law); id. art. XVIII (right to effective judicial recourse).
134. See supra Section I.A.
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quent attacks or human rights abuses due to its lack of criminal authority.'35
As a result, tribal governments cannot act with due diligence to ensure indi-
viduals' rights to life or provide them with access to justice or an effective
remedy because they lack the jurisdiction to investigate and punish the non-
Indian perpetrator.136 Even when Indian nations have criminal authority, as
in the cases involving two Indians, federal law restricts their ability to pre-
vent and punish these crimes by limiting their sentencing authority.'37 Thus,
the Indian nation may not be able to act with due diligence even when the
private act of violence is committed by an Indian.
The difficulty in applying the rules governing criminal authority in In-
dian country poses additional problems for Indian governments trying to
respond to private acts of violence with due diligence. The multiple re-
quirements for determining which governmental authority has jurisdiction
undermine the ability of victims to report crime."38 These barriers to report-
ing often discourage women from reporting such crimes, making it even
more difficult for tribal governments to prevent, investigate, and punish
private acts of violence. As a result, victims of private acts of violence in
Indian country are regularly denied access to justice and an effective judi-
cial remedy. Rather than promote human rights, federal restrictions on tribal
criminal authority make it almost impossible for Indian nations to exercise
due diligence in preventing, investigating, and punishing private acts of
violence in Indian country.
The United States' abysmal record of preventing, investigating, and
punishing private acts of violence in Indian country may make it legally
responsible for violations of human rights instruments there. The United
States has signed and ratified several human rights treaties, including the
ICCPR and ICERD, which obligate it to act with due diligence in response
135. Tribes may, and many have, turned to civil law as a way of trying to prevent
violence against women. For example, tribal courts may grant protection orders against non-
Indians. See, e.g., SHELBY SETTLES HARPER & CHRISTINA MARIE ENTREKIN, OFFICE ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN & THE NATIONAL CENTER ON FULL FAITH AND CREDIT, VIOLENCE
AGAINST NATIVE WOMEN: A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONER ACTION 13-14 (2006).
136. The right to life is often described as the most fundamental of all individual
human rights. See, e.g., Case of the "Street Children" v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, 144 (Nov. 19, 1999) (stating that the full exercise of the right
to life is essential for the exercise of all other human rights). International human rights
bodies have consistently interpreted the right to life as including the guarantee to be free
from violence. See, e.g., Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 1 th Sess., General Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women, 7-8, U.N.
Doc. A/47/38; GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1993); cf G.A. Res. 58/147, 5, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/58/147 (Feb. 19, 2004).
137. See supra Section I.A.
138. For a list of these requirements, see supra Section I.A.
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to private violence.'39 As described in Section I.A, the United States gov-
ernment frequently fails to respond or responds inadequately to private acts
of violence in Indian country. It may not be fulfilling its duty to prevent,
investigate, and punish private violence in Indian country. For example,
because the federal government rarely prosecutes crimes in Indian country,
non-Indian perpetrators routinely are not punished. This pattern of non-
punishment undermines the prevention of future human rights abuses. It
creates a climate conducive to further human rights violations "since society
sees no evidence of willingness by the State, as the representative of the
society, to take effective action to sanction such acts."'40 In reality, it often
translates into impunity for non-Indian perpetrators, who are then free to
target Indians in Indian country and commit even greater atrocities. 4 ' This
failure of the United States to investigate, prosecute, and punish private acts
of violence may suggest its complicity in the perpetuation of these private
acts in Indian country and its responsibility for these acts based on this
complicity. '42
Further, the United States' failure to act with due diligence may lead
to violations of other rights recognized by these human rights instruments,
including the victims' rights to life and equal protection under the law."'
The failure of federal and state governments to punish violent offenders in
Indian country undermines the survivor's rights to life and security of the
person by subjecting her-especially the domestic violence survivor, who
has an ongoing relationship with the perpetrator-to the constant threat of,
or an actual ongoing, escalating cycle of violence.'" Even survivors who do
not know their attacker are at risk because if the attacker approaches her
139. See ICCPR Senate Document, supra note 99; International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-18 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; see also notes 98-110 and accompanying
text.
140. See Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
54/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/1I. I 11, doc. 20 rev. 56 (2000).
141. Some non-Indian perpetrators seem to be aware of the restrictions on tribal
criminal authority and target Indian country specifically because they believe (often correct-
ly) they can get away with criminal activities there. See, e.g., MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note
23, at 30 ("Reportedly, the apparent gap in jurisdiction or enforcement has encouraged non-
Indian individuals to pursue criminal activities of various kinds in Indian Country."); id. at
61 ("[T]he failure to prosecute sex crimes against American Indian women is an invitation to
prey with impunity.").
142. As described in Section I.B, under the due diligence principle, governments can
be held accountable for their systematic failure to prevent and punish human rights violations
perpetrated by individuals within their territory. See supra Section I.B.
143. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
144. Donald G. Dutton, et al., Arrest and the Reduction of Repeat Wife Assault, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 111, 111-16 (Buzawa &
Buzawa eds., 1992) (noting that domestic abusers are often repeat offenders and that police
intervention reduces recidivism in identified populations of wife abusers).
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again, the tribal government may not be able to prevent another attack, and
the state or federal government may not respond at all. '45
Some evidence already suggests that the United States may be in vio-
lation of the human rights of Indian women by failing to protect them from
the epidemic of violence occurring in Indian country. International human
rights bodies have criticized the United States government for its failure to
fulfill its due diligence obligations to Indian women. In 2008, the CERD
Committee found the United States government had violated Indian wom-
en's rights to security of the person (Article 5(b)) and effective protection
and remedies (Article 6) under the ICERD.146 In its Concluding Observa-
tions and Report, the Committee stated,
The Committee also notes with concern that the alleged insufficient will of federal
and state authorities to take action with regard to such violence and abuse often de-
prives victims belonging to racial, ethnic and national minorities, and in particular
Native American women, of their right to access to justice and the right to obtain
adequate reparation or satisfaction for damages suffered. (Articles 5(b) and 6). 147
Other international human rights experts have recently demonstrated
an acute interest in learning more about the epidemic of violence against
women in Indian country. During her 2011 country visit to the United
States, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
visited the Eastern Band of Cherokee in North Carolina to investigate how
federal laws diminish tribal authority to protect Indian women and as a re-
sult, deny Indian women meaningful access to justice and prevent them
from living free from violence.' 48 In October 2011, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights held a special hearing to investigate the
145. Tribal law enforcement officers are typically the first responders to crimes in
Indian country. The likelihood that federal law enforcement would be able to respond quick-
ly is low since most federal law enforcement is not located in-or sometimes even near-
Indian country (unless, of course, the Indian nation has cross-deputized officers). For a fuller
discussion of the problems of prosecution of Indian country crimes by the federal govern-
ment, see Washburn, supra note 12, at 710-12.
146. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reps.
Submitted by State Parties Under Art. 9 of the Convention, 72d Sess., Feb. 18-Mar. 7, 2008,
Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United
States ofAmerica, 26, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (Feb. 2008).
147. Id.
148. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences,
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 1
66, Human Rights Council, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIHRC/17/26/Add.5 (June 1, 2011) (by
Rashida Manjoo). The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism and the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples also learned about this issue on recent visits
to the United States. INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER: JUSTICE FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, Safe
Women, Strong Nations, http://indianlaw.org/safewomen (last visited July 11, 2013) (men-
tioning advocacy before the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism).
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same issues.'49 These investigations by international human rights bodies
indicate that due to the current enforcement environment, the United States
may not be meeting its due diligence obligations towards Indian women
under international human rights law.
Recent decisions by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Commission) also suggest that the United States could incur legal
responsibility under international human rights law for private acts of vio-
lence in Indian country. In Lenahan v. United States, the Commission found
that the United States had failed to exercise due diligence to respect and
ensure the human rights guaranteed to a mother and her three minor daugh-
ters under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. 50
Jessica Lenahan had secured a valid protection order against her former
husband, Simon Gonzales, after he had exhibited erratic and abusive behav-
ior towards her and their three minor daughters.' 5 ' Lenahan noticed her
daughters were missing one evening and suspected her ex-husband had ab-
ducted them, even though the restraining order only allowed very limited,
pre-arranged visitation between them.'52 She repeatedly contacted local law
enforcement, begging them to find her daughters and enforce the protection
order.' 3 Local law enforcement continually dismissed her concerns and
only reluctantly filed a missing persons report several hours after she had
initially contacted them.'54 Early the next morning, the police killed Gonza-
les in a shootout and found Lenahan's young daughters' bodies in Gonza-
les's truck.'5
In Lenahan, the Commission found that the United States' failure to
act with due diligence to prevent domestic violence constituted discrimina-
tion and denied women equal protection and judicial protection.'56 It held
that "the United States violated Jessica's right to judicial protection when it
did not enforce the restraining order and when it failed to adequately inves-
149. INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER: JUSTICE FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, Violence
Against Native Women Gains Global Attention, http://indianlaw.org/safewomen/thematic-
hearing-video-Oct25-2011 (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (providing detailed information and
testimony at thematic hearing on violence against Native Women in the United States before
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on Oct. 25, 2011).
150. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11, OEA/Ser.L.JV/II.142, doe. 11 5 (2011).
151. Id. 66.
152. Id. 24.
153. Id. 71 (finding that "Lenahan had eight contacts" with local police the night
her daughters disappeared).
154. Id. 72, 79.
155. Id. 81.
156. Id. 125 ("The international community has consistently referenced the due
diligence standard as a way of understanding what State's human rights obligations mean in
practice when it comes to violence perpetrated against women of varying ages and in differ-
ent contexts, including domestic violence.").
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tigate and provide access to information about the deaths of Jessica's chil-
dren." '157 The Commission explained that Lenahan's restraining order sig-
naled both state knowledge of a risk of harm and the need for state protec-
tion. '58 This judicial recognition of risk and the corresponding need for pro-
tection obligated the state "to ensure that its apparatus responded effectively
and in a coordinated fashion to enforce the terms of this order to protect the
victims from harm."' 59 Once Lenahan made law enforcement aware of the
restraining order, at a minimum, local law enforcement should have thor-
oughly read the order to determine its applicability and whether it had been
violated, verified the existence of the order if the holder did not have a
copy, and attempted to locate and arrest the abuser. 6° In contrast, the Com-
mission described the response of local law enforcement to Lenahan's re-
quests "as fragmented, uncoordinated and unprepared; consisting of actions
that did not produce a thorough determination of whether the terms of the
restraining order at issue had been violated."'' The Lenahan case suggests
that the United States may also be held responsible internationally for viola-
tions of Indian women's rights in a case where the United States was aware
of the risk of violence to an Indian woman but failed to exercise due dili-
gence to prevent it.
II. PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Central to the proposition that governments should be held accounta-
ble for human rights violations is the notion that governments can be held
accountable and that they have the jurisdiction to prevent and punish human
rights violations. As Part I shows, this proposition does not hold for Indian
nations when it comes to certain human rights abuses. For Indian nations to
157. Max D. Siegel, Surviving Castle Rock: The Human Rights of Domestic Violence,
18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 727, 732 (2012) (citing Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, 177, 180, 194, 199 (2011)).
158. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, 1142 (stat-
ing "that the issuance of a restraining order signals a State's recognition of risk that the bene-
ficiaries would suffer harm from domestic violence on the part of the restrained party, and
need State protection").
159. Id.T 145.
160. Id. 147 (explaining that under the due diligence standard, local law enforce-
ment "would have reasonably been expected to thoroughly review the terms of the order to
understand the risk involved, and their obligations towards this risk. According to the re-
quirements of the order itself, the CRPD should have promptly investigated whether its terms
had been violated. If in the presence of probable cause of a violation, they should have ar-
rested or sought a warrant for the arrest of Simon Gonzales as the order itself directed. This
would have been part of a coordinated protection approach by the State, involving the actions
of its justice and law enforcement authorities").
161. Id. 150.
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be accountable, however, they first need to have the jurisdiction to ensure
and respect individual human rights.
Removing the current limitations on tribal criminal authority would
enhance the accountability of both Indian nations and the federal govern-
ment for human rights violations based on private acts of violence in Indian
country. '62 Numerous scholars, '63 policy-makers, "6 practitioners, '65 and trib-
al advocates'66 have recommended that the United States remove the current
limitations on tribal criminal authority. Removing barriers on tribal criminal
jurisdiction could involve restoring felony jurisdiction over Indians'67 and
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians'68 to Indian nations. Both pro-
posals merit serious consideration'69 and could extend to all Indian nations,
including those affected by federal statutes delegating criminal authority to
state governments. 7 0
Most recent proposals, scholarly and otherwise, advocate for allowing
tribal governments to opt in or choose whether they want to exercise ex-
panded criminal jurisdiction. '7' The opt-in approach does not require all
162. In focusing on the legal barriers to human rights accountability in Indian coun-
try, I do not mean to suggest that removing these alone will cure all the problems related to
violence in Indian country. Solving the problem of violence in Indian country, admittedly,
will also require proactive and preventative approaches to providing shelters and advocacy
services for victims, re-educating abusers, treating underlying personal issues, such as drug
or alcohol abuse, and much, much more. This proposal is merely an important piece of a
larger effort to heal Indian communities so the violence will end.
163. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 15, at 24 ("Federal policy should seek to restore
tribal capacities for handling some or all of these functions."); FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 7-
9.
164. Most recently, versions of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of
2012, S. 1925, 112th Cong. (2012), and the Stand Against Violence and Empower (SAVE)
Native Women Act, S. 1763, 112th Cong. (2011), have included proposals for limited resto-
rations to Indian nations of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
165. Examining the Prevalence of and Solutions to Stopping Violence Against Indian
Women: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 41-62 (2007) (state-
ment of Riyaz A. Kanji, Kanji & Katzen).
166. Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sover-
eignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule 14 (KSG Faculty Research Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. RWP04-016, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=529084 (stating that Indian nations "repeatedly strive now to over-
turn [the] distinctions" between Indian and non-Indian for criminal purposes).
167. See Washburn, supra note 47, at 848-49.
168. FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 7-9.
169. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 15, at 24 ("Federal policy should seek to restore
tribal capacities for handling some or all of these functions."); FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 7-
9.
170. See, e.g., Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 16, at 725 (suggesting need to
reconsider Pub. L. No. 280 and allow greater retrocession on a tribe-by-tribe basis).
171. FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 8; Gideon M. Hart, A Crisis in Indian Country: An
Analysis of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 139, 183-84
(2010); Samuel E. Ennis, Comment, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction
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tribal governments to accept expanded jurisdiction.12 It also responds to the
reality of scarce resources in Indian country and the probability that not all
tribal governments currently have the institutional capacity to exercise ex-
panded criminal jurisdiction.'73 An opt-in approach would allow Indian na-
tions to exercise expanded criminal jurisdiction as soon as they are ready to
do so. The recently enacted VAWA is an example of an opt-in approach in
that it restores inherent tribal authority over a limited set of domestic vio-
lence crimes to participating tribal governments.'74
The success of any restoration of jurisdiction, including the VAWA
provisions, will depend in large part on tribal governments receiving ade-
quate funding for their law enforcement and legal systems. Many tribal
governments rely, at least in part, on federal funding to operate their court
systems.'75 Tribal leaders, policymakers, and federal government officials
have long criticized the levels of federal funding to support tribal court sys-
tems as inadequate.'76 To date, no tribal governments are exercising the spe-
cial domestic violence jurisdiction under VAWA, and lack of resources
remains a barrier to Indian nations wanting to exercise expanded criminal
jurisdiction.
This Part endorses the VAWA provisions and agrees that Congress
should restore criminal authority to Indian nations. Rather than address the
Over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV.
553, 574-75 (2009). Other proposals have suggested that tribal governments be able to opt
out of exercising expanded criminal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Amy Radon, Note, Tribal Juris-
diction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation,
37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1311 (2004) (citing L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes:
Rethinking Sovereignty After Atkinson and Hicks, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 669, 691 (2003)).
Even though an opt-out solution may seem more consistent with tribal sovereignty, there are
distinct long-term advantages to an opt-in solution. With an opt-out solution, some tribal
governments would most likely have to opt out immediately because they do not have the
financial resources or institutional capacity to exercise increased criminal jurisdiction. These
tribal governments may face challenges to regaining this criminal authority later when they
have the financial resources and institutional capacity to exercise it. In contrast, tribal gov-
ernments may be able to more easily opt in to expanded criminal jurisdiction when they are
ready to do so. Thanks to Jana Walker for making the advantages of an opt-in over an opt-out
restoration of tribal criminal jurisdiction clear to me.
172. FLETCHER, supra note 34, at 8; Hart, supra note 171, at 183-84; Ennis, supra
note 171, at 574-75.
173. See, e.g., GAO REPORT ON TLOA, supra note 60, at 2-3 (finding that most tribal
governments surveyed are not implementing TLOA's enhanced sentencing authority because
they lack the resources to do so and recommending that the federal government clarify its
grant programs so it can provide more resources to tribes).
174. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong.
(2013); see supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
175. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO- 11-252, INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: DEPARTMENTS OF THE INTERIOR AND JUSTICE SHOULD STRENGTHEN COORDINATION
TO SUPPORT TRIBAL COURTS 21 (2011).
176. Id.; GAO REPORT ON TLOA, supra note 60, at 2.
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constitutionality or legality of Congress doing this, I consider the benefits of
restoring tribal criminal authority from a human rights perspective. Remov-
ing the current limitations on tribal criminal authority may enhance the ac-
countability of both Indian nations and the federal government for human
rights violations based on private acts of violence in Indian country.'77 In
Section II.A, I explain how removing federal barriers on tribal criminal au-
thority is consistent with and would bring the United States in compliance
with international law and Congress's tribal self-determination policy. In
Section II.B, I demonstrate how restoring tribal criminal authority may en-
courage tribal governments to be more accountable for human rights viola-
tions based on private acts of violence and possibly reduce these human
rights violations in Indian country in the long term.
A. Removing Jurisdictional Barriers Ensures U.S. Compliance with Interna-
tional Law and Congress's Self-Determination Policy
Removing the current barriers on tribal government authority benefits
the United States government by ensuring the United States' compliance
with international law and its self-determination policy. Subsection II.A. 1
focuses on how restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations promotes United
States compliance with international law. Subsection II.A.2 discusses how
removing restrictions on tribal criminal authority furthers the United States'
policy of self-determination.
1. Complying with International Law
As described in Section I.C, the United States government may not be
fulfilling its international obligations to respond with due diligence to pri-
vate acts of violence. Increasingly, international human rights bodies have
focused on structural barriers to the exercise and promotion of individual
human rights and the need for states to take positive action to ensure and
respect human rights. ' This focus implies that the best way for the United
States to comply with international human rights law is to remedy structural
barriers undermining human rights protection, including removing the barri-
ers to tribal criminal authority.'79 Thus, what at first blush looks like an in-
177. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
179. Compliance with international human rights law appears to require the removal
of these structural barriers. In fact, many Native women's activists have recommended that
the United States enhance its protection of Native women by removing barriers to tribal
criminal jurisdiction and strengthening tribal governance. Brief for Indian Law Resource
Center & Sacred Circle National Resource Center to End Violence Against Native Women
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3-4, Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-
Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11, OEA/Ser.L./V/I1.142, doc. 11 (2011).
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ternational human rights problem in fact requires a domestic legal solution,
namely that the United States restore jurisdiction to Indian nations.
The removal of current limitations on Indian nations' authority would
ensure United States compliance with the collective or group rights of Indi-
an nations recognized by international law. Most importantly, it would pro-
mote the right of self-determination of Indian nations under international
law. ' Many of the other proposals to remedy criminal jurisdiction issues in
Indian country, which focus on increasing federal enforcement, 8 ' fail to
recognize the role of indigenous peoples' rights in securing international
human rights in Indian country. Tribal sovereignty or self-determination is
key to respecting the rights of Indian individuals.' 2 The relationship be-
tween human rights and peoples' rights is particularly important in the case
of violent crime where the majority of perpetrators are non-Indian and the
community lacks the tools to protect itself from these violent perpetrators.
The right of self-determination is a well-established general principle
of international law.'83 The right of self-determination provides that peoples
should be able to decide for themselves what country they live in and what
their government should be.'84 Several key international instruments endorse
the right of self-determination of peoples, including the United Nations
Charter, the ICCPR, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).' 85 The United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples reaffirms the right of self-determination for
indigenous peoples, including Indian nations in the United States, in almost
identical language to the ICCPR and ICESCR. 86
180. See infra Subsection II.A.2.
181. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 15, at 23.
182. Anecdotal evidence suggests increasing the presence of federal law enforcement
and federal prosecutions of Indian country crime will not resolve the epidemic of violent
crimes on all reservations. Timothy Williams, An Indian Reservation in Crime's Deadly
Grip, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/us/wind-river-indian-reservation-where-brutality-is-
banal.html?_r=0 (noting that crime on the Wind River Indian Reservation surged during a
two-year crime fighting initiative by the federal government).
183. BROWNLIE, supra note 76, at 580.
184. Id.
185. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (stating that countries agree to base their relations on
"respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"); id art. 55;
ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights art. 1, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
186. U.N. Declaration, supra note 70, art. 3 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."); cf ICCPR, supra note 28,
art. I (stating that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cul-
tural development"); ICESCR, supra note 185, art. I (stating that "[a]ll peoples have the
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Under international law, states are to respect the self-determination of
peoples, including peoples within an existing state.'87 Article 1 of the
ICCPR specifically obligates state parties, including the United States, to
recognize the right of self-determination.' The Declaration extends this
expectation to indigenous peoples by recognizing that they have the same
right of self-determination'89 as other peoples. Thus, the United States
should respect Indian nations' right of self-determination.
The content or meaning of the right of self-determination is not well
defined by international law. 9° In the context of indigenous peoples, the
content of the right of self-determination may be inferred from the Declara-
tion even though it does not formally define the right of self-
determination.'' A key aspect of the right of self-determination under the
Declaration is the right of indigenous peoples to develop, promote, and
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development").
187. U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55; Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N.
Doc. A/8028, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970); see also Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998]
S.C.R. 217, 285 (Can.). Scholars disagree over whether the right of self-determination is a
peremptory norm of customary international law. See, e.g., HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS
44-45 (1990).
188. ICCPR, supra note 28, art. 1.
189. U.N. Declaration, supra note 70, art. I ("Indigenous peoples have the right to the
full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental free-
doms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and international human rights law."); Coulter, supra note 37 (explaining that
"indigenous peoples, like all peoples, are entitled to self-determination as provided in the
Covenants"); S. James Anaya, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the
Post-Declaration Era, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 184, 185 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo
Stavenhagen eds., 2009). Prior to the adoption of the Declaration, the fight of self-
determination in Article I of the ICCPR was not thought to extend to indigenous peoples.
For a fuller discussion of Article I of the ICCPR, see HANNUM, supra note 187, at 4344.
190. One limitation is clear: only in exceptional circumstances does the right of self-
determination include a right to secede from an existing state. See, e.g., Reference Re Seces-
sion of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. at 284 ("[T]he general state of international law with respect
to the right to self-determination is that the right operates within the overriding protection
granted to the territorial integrity of 'parent' states.").
191. The right of self-determination in the Declaration does not include the right to
secede from an existing country. The rule of territorial integrity is explicitly stated in the
Declaration in Article 46. U.N. Declaration, supra note 70, art. 46 ("Nothing in this Declara-
tion may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to en-
gage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, total-
ly or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.").
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maintain their institutional structures.'92 Without the ability to develop in-
digenous institutional structures, many of the rights recognized in the Decla-
ration, including rights to health and special protections for women and
children, may be meaningless. For example, Article 22 mandates special
protections for indigenous elders, women, and children and obligates the
state to "take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure
that indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guaran-
tees against all forms of violence and discrimination."' 93 As suggested in
Section II.B, the best way to ensure these rights is through the promotion of
indigenous legal systems, including their public safety and law enforcement
systems. The Declaration seems to envision this possibility in Article 34,
which states, "Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and
maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spiritual-
ity, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, jurid-
ical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights
standards."' 94 The current enforcement environment in Indian country ap-
pears to undermine the rights in both Articles 22 and 34. Indian women are
subject to high rates of violence, and at least one empirical study indicates
that the current enforcement environment in Indian country has retarded
tribal institutional development when it comes to law enforcement and legal
systems."' Thus, rather than create incentives for Indian nations to take
human rights seriously and ensure special protections to vulnerable popula-
tions, the enforcement environment has created disincentives to human
rights accountability in Indian country by limiting the authority and re-
sources available to Indian nations to respond to human rights violations
based on private acts of violence.'96
The Declaration is a non-binding instrument, meaning that nation-
states are not legally bound to recognize the rights it affirms and that cur-
rently the United States cannot be held responsible for a violation of it under
international law. 19 The Declaration is, however, an official statement by
192. Id. art. 4 ("Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination,
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local
affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions."); id art. 5
("Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal
economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if
they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State."); id. art. 21,
para. 1.
193. Id. art. 22.
194. Id. art. 34.
195. See Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 16, at 704.
196. For a fuller discussion on how federal Indian law generally provides Indian
nations with perverse incentives and undermines tribal government initiatives, see Jacob T.
Levy, Three Perversities of Indian Law 10 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://works.bepress.com/jacob levy/i.
197. See Coulter, supra note 31, at 546.
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most United Nations member states of the rights of indigenous peoples un-
der international law.'98 As such, it carries tremendous moral and political
force, "leads to an expectation of maximum compliance by States," and
serves as a basis for emerging customary law.'99 Some of the standards in
the Declaration are already state practice, and states, including the United
States, are increasingly recognizing the right of indigenous peoples to de-
velop their own legal institutions."' In its most recent report, the Interna-
tional Law Association Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
concluded and recommended that states "comply-according to customary
and, where applicable, conventional international law-with the obligation
to recognize and promote the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy or
self-government," including "the right... to establish, maintain and devel-
op their own legal and political institutions. '20' The United States should
comply with the Declaration regardless of whether it is legally obligated to
because it reaffirms the existing international principle of self-determination
and reflects the United States' commitment to work with Indian nations on
the challenges that they face.20 2
Removing the barriers to tribal criminal jurisdiction contributes to the
implementation of the right of self-determination for Indian nations recog-
nized under international law and the individual human rights of indigenous
peoples. The Declaration recognizes that the right of self-determination for
Indian nations is key to ensuring the individual human rights of indigenous
peoples. The development and maintenance of tribal institutional structures,
in particular, will help tribal governments to increase public safety and deter
violence in their communities.
2. Promoting Tribal Self-Determination
Removing the barriers to Indian nations' jurisdictional authority pro-
motes and fulfills the United States government's policy of tribal self-
determination. For the past forty years, the United States government's offi-
198. Id.
199. ILA, supra note 70, at 29.
200. See Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1141,
1176 (2008) ("In important respects, particularly regarding their rights to their territories,
their culture, and internal self-government, the Declaration reaffirms pre-existing rules of
customary international law and treaty law."). For more information on state practice in this
area, see Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Compara-
tive and International LegalAnalysis, 12 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 57 (1999).
201. ILA, supra note 70, at 30.
202. U.S. STATE DEP'T, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE THE
GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP AND IMPROVE THE LIVES OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES (2010), available at http://usun.state.gov/documents/organization/I53239.pdf.
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cial policy towards Indian nations has been one of self-determination.2 °3 The
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 declared
this policy, stating, "[T]he United States is committed to supporting and
assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong and stable tribal gov-
ernments, capable of administering quality programs and developing the
economies of their respective communities. ' '2' Despite a Supreme Court
often unwilling to follow the dictates of the policy, 2°5 Congress's tribal self-
determination policy has provided some Indian nations with the opportunity
to develop effective governing structures, laws, and policies and to foster
long-term economic development.206
Barriers to tribal authority, however, undermine the congressional pol-
icy of tribal self-determination.0 7 While Congress has attempted to address
the self-determination deficit in other areas, it has lagged behind in moving
to restore jurisdictional authority to Indian nations.0 8 Thus, despite its poli-
cy of self-determination, Congress has rarely reconsidered or amended, and
never repealed, any of the federal statutes limiting tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion and undermining tribal self-determination. Professor Washburn argues
that Congress's failure to implement its self-determination policy in terms
of criminal jurisdiction is particularly problematic because "[c]riminal law
is the formal institution in which a community articulates and codifies its
most sacrosanct values. 2 9 He continues, "To have true self-determination,
a community must be able to define its own moral code through its criminal
laws and articulate a process for enforcing them.
' 21 0
203. Levy, supra note 196, at 10.
204. 25 U.S.C. § 450a (2006).
205. For example, the Supreme Court decided Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
stripping Indian nations of their inherent authority to prosecute non-Indian offenders a mere
three years after Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act. 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
206. Joseph Kalt, Constitutional Rule and the Effective Governance of Native Na-
tions, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE
NATIONS 184, 184 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006) ("At the same time, the evidence is over-
whelming that political self-rule is the only policy that has enabled at least some tribes to
break out of a twentieth-century history of federal government-dominated decision making
that yielded social, cultural, and economic destruction."); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt,
Two Approaches to the Development of Native Nations: One Works, the Other Doesn't, in
REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 7 (Miri-
am Jorgensen ed., 2007).
207. See Levy, supra note 196, at 10.
208. Washburn, supra note 15, at 22 (arguing that Congress has sought to increase
tribal self-determination in health care, education, land management, and environmental
protection, but not criminal jurisdiction).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 23; see also Kalt, supra note 206, at 208 ("Arguably, no dimension of self-
government embodies political sovereignty more than a community's running of its own law
enforcement and court system. For it is in such conduct, with its potential and (if need be)
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Further, implementation of the tribal self-determination policy, includ-
ing restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations, when accompanied by resources
to support it, has proven workable."' Empirical studies have demonstrated
that self-determination is the most effective policy for tribal governments
because tribal governments are most successful when they are given the
opportunity to make their own decisions and have the resources to imple-
ment those decisions.2"2 Under current federal law, Indian nations have not
had an opportunity to choose how they respond to human rights violations
based on private acts of violence because the United States has unilaterally
decided for them by restricting their criminal authority.
B. Restoring Tribal Jurisdiction Promotes Tribal Human Rights Accounta-
bility
While compliance with international law and federal policy are lauda-
tory goals, removing barriers to tribal criminal jurisdiction may increase the
human rights accountability of Indian nations and decrease human rights
violations based on private acts of violence in Indian country in the long
term. First, restoring jurisdictional authority to Indian nations will improve
human rights accountability because it will allow Indian nations to develop
culturally appropriate responses to human rights abuses based on private
violence occurring within their communities. Some evidence suggests that
to the extent possible, some Indian nations are already trying to do this.2 3
Second, restoring jurisdictional authority may increase human rights ac-
countability because it empowers Indian communities to hold their govern-
ments accountable for human rights violations.
1. Increasing Human Rights Defenders
Removing the barriers to tribal authority will increase tribal human
rights accountability because Indian nations will have the opportunity to
respond to violence-based human rights abuses within their communities.2 '4
actual use of coercive force, that a community's institutions of self-determination most stark-
ly cross over from civic organization to government.").
211. Stephen Cornell, Catherine Curtis & Miriam Jorgensen, The Concept of Govern-
ance and Its Implications for First Nations 24-25 (Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs,
Paper No. 2004-02, 2004).
212. Kalt & Singer, supra note 166, at I ("Supported by every U.S. President since
the 1960s and bolstered, for a time, by a combination of federal court rulings and congres-
sional policies, tribal self-rule-sovereignty-has proven to be the only policy that has
shown concrete success in breaking debilitating economic dependence on federal spending
programs and replenishing the social and cultural fabric that can support vibrant and healthy
communities and families.").
213. See infra Subsection II.B. .
214. Cornell, Curtis & Jorgensen, supra note 211, at 14.
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Under the current enforcement environment, the hands of Indian nations are
often tied, with few, if any, options available to them for responding effec-
tively to violence-based human rights abuses z.2 5 As a result, many Indian
nations feel that they cannot effectively protect their women and children,
much less other citizens and residents, from violence-based human rights
abuses. Indian nations cannot develop accountability for human rights un-
less and until they have jurisdiction over private acts of violence and an
opportunity to decide for themselves how they want to address such prob-
lems.
Admittedly, there is no guarantee that Indian nations will do a better
job of respecting individuals and ensuring their protection from human
rights violations based on private acts of violence than the federal govern-
ment currently does. In fact, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers and the National Association of Federal Defenders, among others,
allege that restoring criminal jurisdiction to tribal courts over non-Indians
would deprive non-Indian defendants of basic constitutional rights with no
effective remedy.2"6 Clearly, tribal governments and tribal courts should
respect and protect the rights of everyone-victims and criminal defendants
alike. To some extent,
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) already requires tribal governments to provide
all rights accorded to defendants in state and federal court, including core rights
such as the Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. There is no
question that federal courts have authority to review tribal court decisions which
result in incarceration, and they have the authority to review whether a defendant
has been accorded the rights required by ICRA.2 17
Further, most, if not all, proposals to restore criminal jurisdiction to
Indian nations require them to provide defendants with the same constitu-
tional protections that the criminally accused receive in state and federal
courts.2 8 Admittedly, some tribes may need to increase their protections for
215. See supra Section I.C.
216. See Criminal Defense Letter, supra note 22. A related concern is the complaint
that most Indian nations do not provide public defenders. Id. at 4. Recent amendments to
ICRA, however, require Indian nations to provide public defenders to accused individuals
facing sentences of more than one year in prison. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1) (2006). Most, if not
all, proposals to restore criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to Indian nations have also
included this condition, and it is unlikely that Congress would pass legislation not including
such protection for the accused. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S.
47, 113th Cong. (2013). Additionally, future legislation or Indian nations on their own could
adopt one of the recent proposals for the creation of an intertribal body to ensure external
accountability of tribal courts.
217. Law Professors Letter, supra note 36, at 5 (internal citations omitted).
218. In fact, the Tribal Law and Order Act required Indian nations to provide criminal
defendants with more protections than state courts by requiring law-trained judges. Indian
Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010).
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the rights of defendants in tribal court.2"9 Other Indian nations, however,
already provide more stringent protections for defendants than are required
by state or federal law.220
The fact that some tribes may do a worse job22-just as some states
do a worse job than others at ensuring, respecting, and protecting human
rights-should not lead to the rejection of proposals for restoring jurisdic-
tion to Indian nations. Rather than preventing all tribes from exercising ju-
risdiction because of fears of how some may treat criminal defendants, ef-
forts should focus on empowering Indian nations to acquire more jurisdic-
tion as they are ready by providing opt-in provisions, improving tribal gov-
ernments throughout the country, and allocating financial and other re-
sources to tribal governments so that they can respect and ensure the human
rights of everyone in their communities.
The advantage of a restoration of jurisdiction is that it allows tribal
governments that want to act as human rights defenders to do so rather than
preventing them from doing so. Some Indian nations have demonstrated
considerable concern for the human rights of the people residing within
their territories, and a few have even adopted international human rights
standards for protecting those rights.222 For instance, in 2006, the Navajo
Nation created the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission to hear
claims of human rights violations brought by its citizens. 223 But even when
they demonstrate the desire to address human rights violations, Indian na-
tions are limited in their ability to do so, especially when it comes to human
rights violations based on private acts of violence occurring within their
territories, because of the federal restrictions on their criminal authority.
Once their authority is recognized, Indian nations may prove more re-
sponsive to human rights issues than the federal government. While general-
izations are difficult, if not impossible, to make about 566 Indian and Alas-
219. Criminal Defense Letter, supra note 22, at 4.
220. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, 8 Navajo Rptr. 604, 10 (Navajo 2004)
(requiring law enforcement to give Miranda warnings in English and Navajo). See generally
CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 201-341 (2004).
221. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 799 (2007) (discussing how some tribal governments have illiberal tendencies); Singel,
supra note 24, at 586-87 (explaining that some Indian tribes refuse to waive tribal sovereign
immunity and be accountable for human rights violations).
222. Mark D. Rosen, Evaluating Tribal Courts' Interpretations of the Indian Civil
Rights Act, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 323 (Kristen A. Carpenter, Matthew
L.M. Fletcher & Angela R. Riley eds., 2012) (finding that leaving ICRA enforcement to
tribal courts has not led to significant under-enforcement of individual rights). See generally
Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal
Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005); Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year
in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285 (1997).
223. NAVAJo NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, FAQs, http://www.nnhrc.navajo-
nsn.gov/faqs.html (last visited July 15, 2013).
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ka Native nations, there is no reason to think that respecting and protecting
human rights is inconsistent with their core values. 24 Some Indian nations
have incorporated their traditional views of human dignity, and particularly
respect for women, into their tribal codes and jurisprudence. 225 In some cas-
es, Indian nations provide more protections for the accused 26 and more re-
spect for the rights of women than state and federal courts do.2 7 For exam-
ple, in Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, the Winnebago Supreme
Court relied on tribal teachings and views on gender relations to apply a
higher standard, strict scrutiny, to a claim of gender discrimination than
federal courts would.228
Despite the current limitations on their authority, many Indian nations
are already trying to address human rights violations based on private vio-
lence in their communities. Indian nations have used civil jurisdiction over
Indians and non-Indians to offset their inability to address human rights
violations based on private acts of violence criminally. 29 Some Indian na-
tions have decriminalized their laws so they can charge non-Indians with
civil infractions. Tribal courts have entered civil protection orders against
Indian and non-Indians to prevent further violence,23° occasionally excluded
violent perpetrators from tribal lands, 3 or pursued other civil remedies.
224. Many Indian cultures have traditionally respected human dignity. See, e.g.,
Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889, 911-
15 (2003). Some Indian nations, including the Cherokee, historically dealt with issues like
domestic violence through their clan systems. Jacqueline Agtuca, Beloved Women: Life
Givers, Caretakers, Teachers of Future Generations, in SHARING OUR STORIES OF SURVIVAL:
NATIVE WOMEN SURVIVING VIOLENCE 3, 10-12 (Sarah Deer et at. eds., 2008). Under the
traditional Cherokee clan system, the husband married into and lived with the woman's
family so her extended family assisted in ensuring that she was not mistreated by him. Id. at
12. A woman also had the power to terminate the marriage by putting the man's belongings
outside of her longhouse. For a fuller discussion of how Indian nations traditionally dealt
with issues of violence against women, see generally id.
225. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian
Courts and the Future Revisited 22 (Michigan State Univ. Coll. of Law Legal Studies Re-
search Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-15, 2012), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=2079757 (explaining how the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Pota-
watomi Indians has adopted Anishinaabe customs and traditions as a basis for guaranteeing
fundamental fairness in reviewing government action).
226. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, 8 Navajo Rptr. 604 (Navajo 2004) (re-
quiring law enforcement to give Miranda warnings in English and Navajo).
227. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, 25 Ind. L. Rep. 6229 (Winnebago
1998).
228. Id.
229. See generally Hallie Bongar White, Kelly Gaines Stoner & Hon. James G.
White, 2008 FINAL REPORT: CREATIVE CIVIL REMEDIES AGAINST NON-INDIAN OFFENDERS IN
INDIAN COUNTRY (2008), available at http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/civil-remedies.pdf.
230. HARPER & ENTREKIN, supra note 135, at 16.
231. See, e.g., Mille Lacs Band Banishes Four over Violence, INDIANZ.COM (Oct. 6,
2008), http://www.indianz.comNews/2008/011208.asp.
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Some tribes, like the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, have developed
innovative programs to combat domestic and sexual violence. The Missis-
sippi Choctaw's Family Violence and Victim's Services Program uses "sev-
eral complementary strategies to combat domestic violence and its after-
math.""23 In addition to revising the Tribe's penal code and raising commu-
nity awareness, the Program facilitates interagency cooperation to ensure
that the victims' physical, emotional, and legal needs are met.233
The few existing empirical studies of tribal law enforcement and tribal
courts also suggest that many Indian nations already try to respect human
rights and human dignity. These studies demonstrate that self-rule improves
service delivery and accountability by suggesting that Indian nations pro-
vide better services when they have an opportunity to do so.234 Kalt and
Singer report,
As in economic performance and the delivery of other governmental services, trib-
al assumption of policing and law enforcement activities under contracting ... with
the federal government for what would otherwise be federal responsibilities ap-
pears to improve both the objective performance of policing on reservations and
the subjective attitudes of reservation [residents] toward police activities. 235
Similarly, in their study on law enforcement in Indian country, Gold-
berg and Champagne found that reservation residents "tend to believe that
tribal police are much more available than state, country, [or] federal po-
lice. '236 Reservation residents also indicated that tribal police respond in a
timely fashion more often 237 and investigate crimes as thoroughly or more
thoroughly than state, federal, and county police.238 Further, according to
reservation residents, tribal police were not more likely to overstep their
authority than federal, county, or state police.239 Some scholars attribute this
improved accountability for law enforcement to the benefits of local tribal
control. 240
232. THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
HONORING NATIONS: 2003 HONOREE: FAMILY VIOLENCE & VICTIM'S SERVICES, MISSISSIPPI
BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS 2, available at
http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/Family%/2Violence%20and%2OVictims%20
Services.pdf.
233. Id.
234. Kalt & Singer, supra note 166, at 31.
235. Id.
236. Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 16, at 711.
237. Id. at 713.
238. Id. at717.
239. See id. at 718. In fact, Public Law 280 reservation residents indicated that state
police were the most likely to overstep their authority. Id.
240. Kalt & Singer, supra note 166, at 31 ("At the Gila River Indian Community, for
example, tribal control since 1998 is serving a fast-growing reservation population of 17,000
on the south side of the Phoenix metropolitan area. By supplementing the funds otherwise
spent by the federal government with tribal funds, Gila River Police Department has been
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Existing studies of tribal courts also demonstrate that many tribal
courts are trying to ensure and respect human rights. Some tribal courts
even "guarantee fundamental fairness to tribal court litigants beyond the
minimum standards of the Indian Civil Rights Act."' 4 ' In his comprehensive
study of ICRA implementation by tribal courts, Professor Rosen concluded
that leaving ICRA enforcement to tribal courts has not led to significant
under-enforcement of individual rights.242 Another study, which examined
one year's reported tribal court decisions, found that non-Indian parties
were treated fairly. 43 Similarly, Professor Berger's study of Navajo courts
demonstrated that Navajo appellate courts are evenly balanced for and
against non-Indian defendants. 2" Additionally, a recent study indicates that
reservation residents perceive tribal courts to treat Indians and non-Indians
the same.245
Allowing tribal governments the authority to address human rights is-
sues will empower them to respond to these issues more fully and in cultur-
ally appropriate ways. By culturally appropriate ways, I mean that Indian
nations will have the ability to draw from their own sources of human rights
law to protect and defend human rights in accordance with international
law.246 Indian nations may be more likely to respect and ensure human
able to significantly expand its staff size, improve conventional police and ranger services,
and enhance management information capacities. Through a focus on community policing, it
also has developed neighborhood block watch programs, a Citizens Policy Academy, and a
bicycle patrol/police cadets unit. As a result of these efforts, the Department has sharply
improved response time and decreased crime (while the rates for similar crimes have risen in
neighboring Phoenix).").
241. Fletcher, supra note 225, at 3.
242. Rosen, supra note 222, at 323. Other studies suggest that tribal courts do not
deviate substantially from federal and state law in interpreting the due process and equal
protection clauses in ICRA. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 222, at 323; Fletcher, supra note
225, at 3.
243. Newton, supra note 222, at 352.
244. Berger, supra note 222, at 1074-79.
245. CAROLE GOLDBERG, DUANE CHAMPAGNE & HEATHER VALDEZ SINGLETON, FINAL
REPORT: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER PUBLIC LAw 280, at 189 (2007).
In contrast, "[t]he reservation-resident respondents generally say that tribal defendants or
victims are treated less fairly than non-Indians in state or county courts." Id. at 187. Similar-
ly, "[rieservation residents in non-Public Law 280 jurisdictions say that federal court judges
and juries are significantly biased in treating Indian cases, while Indian cases are treated
more fairly in tribal courts." Id. at 190.
246. 1 am not advocating for cultural relativism here or defending the right of Indian
nations to act illiberally. International law allows for culturally influenced implementation of
universal human rights. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 24, at 517. The Declaration also
suggests that Indian nations can promote and develop institutions in accordance with their
distinctive traditions and customs and international human rights law. U.N. Declaration,
supra note 70, art. 34. Indian nations have their own sources and traditions of human rights
and may benefit from using their cultural traditions to implement universally recognized
human rights. For a fuller discussion of how Indian nations have their own sources and tradi-
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rights because they will be able to tailor their responses to violence to the
values and traditions of their communities. Studies of good governance sug-
gest that tribal governments are more accountable when they have culturally
appropriate rules and institutions.247 Further, some Indian nations have had
tremendous success in implementing culturally appropriate policies and
programs. For example, the Tulalip Tribes greatly reduced recidivism rates
on the reservation within three years of implementing an Alternative Sen-
tencing Program based on their traditional values. 4 Similarly, by taking
responsibility for law enforcement in its community through § 638 com-
pacting, the Gila River Indian Community improved response times and
tailored services to better meet its community's needs.249 Restoring jurisdic-
tion to Indian nations will allow them to choose culturally appropriate ways
to ensure and respect human rights rather than have federal law imposed
upon them.25 While some Indian nations, like the Navajo Nation, may
choose to create a Human Rights Commission to address alleged violations
of human rights,' others may use Western-style courts or traditional meth-
ods of dispute resolution or adopt international human rights standards.252
tions of human rights, see John Borrows, Robina Chair in Law, Pub. Policy & Soc'y, Univ.
of Minn. Law Sch., Negotiating an Intertribal Human Rights Treaty: Lessons from Indige-
nous Law, Presentation at the Michigan State Law Review Symposium: Indian Tribes and
Human Rights Accountability (Oct. 4, 2012).
247. Cornell, Curtis & Jorgensen, supra note 211, at 19 ("[A]s Harvard Project re-
search shows, governing institutions must be viewed as legitimate by the First Nation's citi-
zens if they are to be effective. This means institutions have to match citizens' ideas of how
authority should be organized and exercised; otherwise, citizens are unlikely to view the
institutions as their own and are unlikely to support them.").
248. THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
HONORING NATIONS: 2006 HONOREE: TULALIP ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING PROGRAM, TULALIP
TRIBES 3, available at
http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/Tulalip%20Aternative%2OSentencing%2OPro
gram.pdf (noting that "25% of the participants in the Program do not re-offend, as compared
to only 7-9% in the county").
249. THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
HONORING NATIONS: 2003 HONOREE: ASSURING SELF DETERMINATION THROUGH AN
EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, GILA RIVER POLICE DEPARTMENT, GILA RIVER
INDIAN COMMUNITY 2-3, available at
http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/Assuring%2 0SelP/2ODetermination%2throu
gh%20an%20Effective%2OLaw%20Enforcement%2OProgram.pdf.
250. Cornell, Curtis & Jorgensen, supra note 211, at 10 ("[J]urisdiction alone is not
enough. Successful societies also require effective and culturally appropriate rules that make
it possible to get things done and at the same time protect those societies-and others-from
the misuse of power.").
251. NAVAJO NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, supra note 223.
252. My focus here is less on how Indian nations choose to ensure, respect, and pro-
tect human rights than about them having the ability to do so.
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2. Improving Democratic Accountability for Human Rights
Restoring criminal jurisdiction to Indian nations will make them di-
rectly accountable to their communities for failures to ensure human rights.
Under the current enforcement environment, tribal officials can rarely pre-
vent, investigate, and punish human rights violations based on private acts
of violence because they are so limited in their ability to do so.253 The limits
on their authority allow them to blame the federal government rather than
take responsibility themselves."' Removing federal barriers to tribal juris-
diction makes tribal officials more accountable because they will not be able
to blame the federal government for their own failures to act.
Restoring jurisdiction may increase tribal accountability for human
rights because "[s]elf-governance marries decisions and their consequenc-
es. 255 Self-governance enhances tribal accountability because as the deci-
sion makers, Indian nations "bear the costs of their own mistakes, and they
reap the benefits of their own successes." '256 Tribal governments should be
more accountable to the people than state and federal governments because
they are more susceptible to community pressure. Consider, for example,
the rationale behind having local officials serve as prosecutors in most
communities in the United States, namely that the advantage of a local pros-
ecutor is that she will act "with [the] community values in mind" because
she is accountable to the community directly through elections and indirect-
ly through media attention and popular attention.257 This rationale currently
breaks down in Indian country where federal prosecutors prosecute the few
violent crimes that are prosecuted. Unlike local prosecutors, most federal
prosecutors do not represent the Indian communities they serve.258 As out-
siders appointed by the federal government rather than elected by the local
people, federal Indian country prosecutors are less likely to feel any pres-
253. See supra Section I.C.
254. Washburn, supra note 12, at 740 ("The existence of exclusively federal jurisdic-
tion for felonies in Indian country shifts the apparent responsibility to maintain institutions
that help to provide safe reservation environments away from local tribal officials and toward
federal officials. The tribal leaders who have been rendered impotent by the scheme theoreti-
cally can criticize and blame the federal prosecutors but must shoulder little of the blame or
accountability for the problem.").
255. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 206, at 13.
256. Id. at 14.
257. Washburn, supra note 12, at 728.
258. Id. at 729 ("Unlike the usual circumstances, in which the prosecutor internalizes
and acts in accordance with the mores and values of the community (of which she theoreti-
cally is a part), a federal prosecutor in Indian country may live hundreds of miles from the
reservation and may not even speak the language used in that community. She may not be
able to understand and internalize the values of the community that she theoretically pro-
tects.").
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sure to be accountable to the community. 59 Professor Washburn summariz-
es the accountability problem: "If an Indian community does not like the
way its offenses are being prosecuted, what action can it take? It can vote
for a different president in the next quadrennial election and hope that the
new president will have a policy more in line with the community's de-
sires."2" Similar accountability problems can arise with federal law en-
forcement in Indian country.2 6 1
Restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations could increase human rights
accountability by allowing tribal governments to investigate and prosecute
violent crimes. Tribal governmental control over prosecutors and law en-
forcement would reduce some of the existing accountability problems. The
tribal community would have more tools for encouraging them to ensure
and respect human rights.262 Community members could use community
pressure, elections, and other mechanisms to voice their frustration if offi-
cials are not acting according to their wishes. For example, most tribal gov-
ernments are elected and the tribal community could hold its tribal govern-
ment responsible for failures to respect and ensure human rights through
elections. Depending upon the prosecutorial system enacted by the tribe, the
tribal community may even be able to hold the prosecutor directly responsi-
ble through elections. Under the current enforcement environment, this is
hardly possible as most of the officials responsible for responding to human
rights violations based on private acts of violence in Indian country are fed-
eral or state officials. Removing the barriers to tribal authority would in-
crease accountability because the community would have more options for
holding tribal officials responsible for human rights violations based on
private violence.
259. Id. at 731. In fact, the single greatest complaint about federal prosecutors in
Indian country has been their under-prosecution of crimes. Id. at 733 ("United States Attor-
neys have been widely criticized for decades for failing to give proper attention to Indian
country cases. The substance of such complaints almost always involves the failure to prose-
cute aggressively enough and almost never involves complaints of 'over-prosecution."').
260. Washburn, supra note 15, at 18. When educating tribal communities about crim-
inal jurisdiction issues, I used to tell them to call their Congressman and Senators to com-
plain about issues that they had with federal law enforcement and U.S. Attorneys. Admitted-
ly, this is probably not much more effective than Professor Washburn's recommendation.
261. Washburn, supra note 12, at 734 ("Indeed, lack of accountability by federal law
enforcement has been identified as a chief problem for effective policing in Indian coun-
try."). Some scholars have also suggested that law enforcement officers, who are seen as
outsiders in a community, have a harder time gaining the community's trust and encouraging
crime reporting. See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, Our "Broken System" of Criminal Justice, THE
N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Nov. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/201 l/nov/1 0/our-broken-system-criminal-justice
(reviewing WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011)).
262. Washburn, supra note 15, at 17-18 (noting the need for greater democratic ac-
countability when it comes to justice in Indian country because "the officials involved there
are the least accountable officials in the United States").
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Restoring jurisdiction to Indian nations may also improve tribal ac-
countability for human rights by increasing community involvement in re-
specting and ensuring human rights. A key aspect of increasing community
investment in human rights implementation is ensuring that the community
is engaged with these issues. Under the current enforcement environment,
Indian communities are precluded from such involvement because they are
not part of the criminal justice process. As Professor Washburn explains,
criminal justice in Indian country "is not a process that happens 'of the peo-
ple, for the people, or by the people.' It happens 'to the people' through an
external process run by outsiders." '263 The result of this external process is
that the community often remains outside the criminal justice process. Trib-
al law enforcement and attorneys are not involved in the investigation and
prosecution of crimes. Further, due to the geographical distance between
reservation communities and federal courthouses, the members of the Indian
community rarely serve on juries in Indian country criminal cases or even
learn how cases were resolved.2" The disconnect between the community
and the administration of justice prevents the community from serving a
watchdog role and insisting that human rights be respected. If community
members were informed as to the criminal process and could be involved in
it (such as through jury service), they would be more invested in its out-
comes and in ensuring that its values were represented in the administration
of justice. Local tribal control of the criminal justice system would enhance
the opportunity for the community to be involved in the criminal justice
system because trials would take place in the community. Community
members would become more invested in the system and its ability to en-
sure and respect human rights.
Indian nations may, and probably will, make mistakes as they gain ac-
countability for human rights. Indian nations will also learn from their mis-
takes, if only because the community will hold them accountable for them
either electorally or through community pressure. Over time, this leads to
better tribal decision making and increased accountability.265 In fact, empiri-
cal studies on tribal self-governance find that, "[i]n general, Indian nations
are better decision makers about their own affairs, resources, and futures
because they have the largest stake in the outcomes." '266 These findings seem
263. Id. at 14.
264. Id. ("These cases happen a hundred or more miles away from the communities
where the offenses occurred. And these cases often get little or no publicity on the reserva-
tion. By and large, the press is absent. And many people in the community have no idea what
is happening in these cases.").
265. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 206, at 14 ("As a result, over time and allowing for a
learning curve, the quality of their decisions improves.").
266. Id. ("There are concrete, bottom-line payoffs to tribal self-rule. For example, a
Harvard Project study of 75 tribes with significant timber resources found that, for every
timber-related job that moved from BIA forestry to tribal forestry-that is, for every job that
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to suggest that tribal sovereignty is key to respecting the human rights of
Indian individuals and other individuals within Indian country. They also
seem to imply that it is reasonable to expect that tribal accountability for
human rights will increase once Indian nations can actually respond to hu-
man rights abuses based on private acts of violence within Indian country.
CONCLUSION
Federal law is a serious impediment to ensuring both individual and
collective human rights in Indian country. It creates an environment where
the perpetrators of human rights violations based on private violence and the
governments responsible for preventing them appear to be beyond account-
ability. The federal government is largely unresponsive (despite unilaterally
claiming the sometimes exclusive authority to respond to violent crimes in
Indian country), and federal law strips Indian nations of most of their au-
thority to respond to human rights violations based on private acts of vio-
lence within their territories. The result is the systematic non-enforcement
of criminal laws in Indian country by the federal and state governments
having the authority to do so.
One solution may greatly enhance human rights accountability in In-
dian country: the federal government could remove some, if not all, of the
barriers preventing Indian nations from acting with due diligence to prevent,
investigate, and punish human rights violations based on private acts of
violence in Indian country. This solution, partially adopted by VAWA 2013,
respects the right of self-determination of Indian nations and promotes indi-
vidual human rights in Indian country by recognizing that the exercise of
tribal self-determination is key to the protection of individual human rights.
It will empower many Indian nations to better ensure and respect individual
human rights in Indian country. Restoring criminal jurisdiction to Indian
nations will not ensure the protection of all human rights in all instances,
but it will provide Indian nations with the opportunity to respond to some of
the worst human rights abuses. Studies have shown that once given the op-
portunity and the resources, Indian nations often prove competent in provid-
ing services to their communities. Indian nations should be given the chance
to prove that they can also prevent human rights abuses based on private
acts of violence within their territories.
moved from federal control to tribal control-prices received and productivity in the tribe's
timber operations rose. On average, tribes do a better job of managing their forests because
these are their forests.").

